Abstract: This article joins an important conversation about the proper role
of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) in the administration of civil
justice. Both ADR and formal adjudication are being reconceptualized as
ADR matures into an alternative system, and as ADR methods and
methodology are incorporated into formal adjudication. Professor Main
invokes the history of Equity, another “alternative” system, to inform our
understanding of the forms and limits of ADR. He envisions ADR and
formal adjudication as dual systems of dispute resolution, and uses the
Equity analogue as a template to develop a theory of ADR.

ADR: THE NEW EQUITY
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The course of justice is like the alternation of the seasons. There is the
hope and inspiration of spring and the achievement and reward of
summer, and there is the descent and sacrifice of autumn and the moral
and intellectual destitution of winter, and the changes in our jurisprudence
will come accordingly in spite of us, however much we may be the
1
appointed instruments in their consummation.

INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of ADR has transformed dispute resolution. As both a
rival and a complement to formal adjudication, ADR presents an alternative
forum for most disputes. ADR offers a system with procedural flexibility, a
broad range of remedial options, and a focus on individualized justice. ADR
performs convenient and useful works that cannot be done, or cannot easily
be done, through formal adjudication. And in every case in which one of the
various modes of ADR offers a process or reaches a result that differs
materially from those of the formal courts, there is in fact a rival system.
Thus contemporary civil justice may be administered by dual systems of
formal adjudication, on one hand, and a constellation of ADR methods on
the other.
The administration of justice through divided systems is a familiar
model. For centuries the Anglo-American legal system administered justice
through the systems of law and equity. The law courts ensured uniformity
and predictability, while courts in equity tempered the law to the needs of
the particular case. Although there was considerable tension between the
*
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two regimes, they were also symbiotic. Over time the law courts adopted
many of the best practices of equity. Meanwhile, efforts to crystallize the
jurisdiction of equity introduced complexity and procedural technicalities
that turned that system into a jus strictum differing little from the common
law. With each system looking increasingly like the other, law and equity
were merged into a single system in a wave of reforms in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The reformers envisioned a unified procedural
apparatus that would permit judges to jointly administer the substance of
both law and equity. However, an important ingredient of the jurisprudence
of equity was displaced by the procedural merger: a merged system offered
no recourse from the procedural apparatus itself when the unique needs of a
particular case demanded a different procedure. Moreover, the substance of
equity lost much of its vitality in the merged system.
The system of ADR stands in this breach created by the merger of law
and equity. ADR offers an alternative system for relief from the hardship
created by the substantive and procedural law of formal adjudication.
Moreover, the freedom, elasticity and luminance of ADR bear a striking
resemblance to traditional Equity, offering relaxed rules of evidence and
procedure; tailored remedies; a simpler and less legalistic structure;
improved access to justice; and a casual relationship with the substantive
law. Alas, the dark side of ADR is also reminiscent of the vulnerabilities of
Equity: unpredictability, secrecy, and the inability to reach beyond the
parties immediately before it.
The reincarnation of equity through ADR illustrates a pervasive
dialectic between law and equity. Conflict between the goals of certainty
and individual justice has created an ambivalent attitude in the law toward
equity, to which the law is attracted by reason of the identification of equity
with a general sense of justice, but which the law ultimately rejects because
of the law’s concern for certainty. Hence, a vibrant system of equity
mediated the strict law until it, too, became bound and confined by the
channels of its own precedents and the technicalities of its own procedures.
ADR emerged, in turn, as the equitable alternative. And the pattern repeats:
the remarkable popularity of ADR leads inevitably, albeit ironically, to
reforms that would constrain that very system.
This Article uses an equity paradigm to develop a theory of ADR and,
where necessary, to guide reform. Preserving equity through ADR is
important because no set of prohibitive or declaratory rules will do justice
in all cases or will anticipate all situations. Because unimaginable events are
inevitable, some alternative or escape from formalism is important. Indeed,
equity, not codification, is the progressive force in the law. When formal
adjudication cannot provide a plain, adequate and complete remedy, the
system of ADR should be flexible enough to deliver individualized justice.
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The repeated exercise of that protean jurisdiction identifies systemic failures
of the formal system and ultimately wields a reforming influence. The need
for an autonomous system of discretionary law is as great as or greater than
ever. I thus argue that equity should make the most of the modern
instrument, ADR, as it once did of the subpoena.
This Article consists of five steps. Parts I and II are largely descriptive.
Part I briefly describes the emergence of ADR as a court of general civil
jurisdiction. Part II calls attention to the characteristics of traditional equity
that are echoed in the system of ADR.
Parts III and IV analyze the dynamic and oppositional forces of law and
equity. Part III focuses on the interplay of those forces between the
traditional dual systems of Law and Equity. Part IV focuses on the
contemporary dual systems of formal adjudication and ADR.
Finally, Part V is prescriptive. I argue that flexibility and discretion
should prevail in ADR processes even when pragmatism may demand detail
and complexity. ADR must be free of the procedural paraphernalia of
certainty and predictability to perform its complementary role in the
administration of justice through dual systems. Contemporary efforts to
standardize and restrict the processes of ADR recognize the right problem,
but propose the wrong solution. The problem is the number and significance
of cases that are resolved outside of formal adjudication. The solution is not
the reform of the (alternative) system that is drawing them in, but rather
reform of the (formal) system that is driving them away.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SYSTEM OF ADR
There are numerous social, cultural and practical forces that steer
disputing parties away from state-sponsored adjudicatory processes.2
Accordingly some grievances never become disputes at all.3 Some disputes
are resolved through private negotiations that lead to consensual solutions.4
2
See generally Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC. REV. 525 (1981) (describing the range and reporting the incidence of
grievances, claims, and civil legal disputes).
3
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (And Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 12-16 (1983)
(suggesting that “only a small portion of troubles and injuries become disputes; [and] only a small portion of these
become lawsuits”; and even when Americans file suit, they are more likely to settle than to litigate); Michelle M.
Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1609 (2002) (reporting that “HPMS data showed that only 13% of negligent injuries …
resulted in malpractice claims”); William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing,
9 LAW & SOC. REV. 63, __ (1974) (noting that persons with grievances will often “lump it” to avoid potential
conflict).
4
See, e.g., Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of
Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & SOC. REV. 701, 713-14 (1977)
(finding only 3.7% voiced complaints studied reached any third party; only 16% of those brought to third parties
were brought to a lawyer or court); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976) (exploring the relationship between negotiation and
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And some disputes are resolved in a triangulated process facilitated by a
neutral third party who is not a judge.5 Even among those cases that are
pursued in the courts, the vast majority are resolved by means other than a
judicial determination.6 The many paths of extrajudicial dispute resolution
have been trod for centuries, and probably always will be.7
Certain contours of the dispute resolution landscape changed in the
1970s, however, as formal adjudication faced especial criticism and
pressures.8 There was an “explosion” of new and complex cases.9
official processes).
Even when a dispute is resolved by settlement, the aggrieved may not take the additional step(s) required to
be compensated. According to a fee-based service that offers to search its database of recent class action
settlement funds, “more than half of those entitled to payment fail to file a claim.” Unclaimed Class Action
Lawsuit Settlement Funds Search, at http://www.unclaimedassets.com/class_action_lawsuit.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2005).
5
See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PROCESSES 6-9 (3d ed. 1999); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
297, 309-28 (1996); Lon Fuller, Mediation—Its Form and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971).
6
A federal court study shows that in 2002 the percentage of federal civil cases tried had dropped to 1.8%
from 11.5% in 1962. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related matters I
Federal and State Courts, 1J. E MPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 459 (2004).
7
See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 4 (1983) (“In many and varied communities,
over the entire sweep of American history, the rule of law was explicitly rejected in favor of alternative means for
ordering human relations and for resolving the inevitable disputes that arose between individuals.”); ROBERT
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 137-40 (1991) (arguing that “legal
instrumentalists have tended to underappreciate the role that nonlegal systems play in achieving social order”).
When we look realistically at the way disputes are resolved currently in even the most State-saturated society,
it is obvious that State dispute resolution techniques play only a backup role. From two teenagers bickering
the backyard to disputes among giant corporations, State techniques, if pertinent at all, come to the fore only
if all else fails…. State law is the Johnny-come-lately on the scene, because the State itself is a relatively
recent development.

IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 4
(1992).
For earlier reports of data collections regarding the high ratio of settlement to trial, see Marc Galanter and
Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339,
1339-40 (1994); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, WIS. L. REV.
631, 662 (1994); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89 (1983); H.
LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 3 (1980); Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers’ Ethics in
Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577 (1975); H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 217 (1970).
The history of arbitration, in particular, has been successfully mined. See, e.g., Paul L. Sayre, Development
of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1927-28); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 132-34 (1934); FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 3 (1952); William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief
Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193; James B. Boskey, A History of Commercial Arbitration in New Jersey, 8 RUT.CAM. L.J. 1 (1976) (tracing English and colonial roots of commercial arbitration); Bruce H. Mann, The
Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the American Revolution, 59 NYU L. REV. 443 (1984);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 931 (1999).
For some history of the mediation movement, see ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 15-32 (1994).
8
Some scholars might date the transformation to the previous decade. See JAMES ALFINI, ET AL.,
MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (2001) (“[M]ediation’s prominence and expanded use emerged in the late
1960’s as part of the ‘movement’ known as ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution.’”); but see id. at 12 (“As activities
coalesced during the 1970’s, several important efforts to improve practice and theory emerged.”).
9
John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Macklin Fleming, Court
Survival in the Litigation Explosion, 54 JUDICATURE 109 (1970); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National
Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767 (1977); Maurice Rosenberg, Let’s Everybody Litigate?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1349
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“Discovery abuse” reached intolerable levels.10 And an unprecedented lack
of civility among lawyers delayed the resolution of cases and jeopardized
the reputation of a profession.11 Critics complained that ordinary citizens no
longer had meaningful access to the courts;12 business clients, too, were
demanding more efficient dispute resolution alternatives.13
Acknowledging a certain amount of “deferred maintenance” in the
courts, Chief Justice Burger convened in April of 1976 The National
(1972); Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil To Promote Justice That Is Civilized, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 797, 808 (1970-1971) (“A comprehensive reinvestigation of the question which human disputes belong in
the courts and which ones do not is long overdue. One reason for this undertaking is practical necessity. Our
courts are simply and plainly being engulfed by a tidal wave of litigation, criminal and civil.”). See generally
Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285, 292
n.44 (2002) (claiming that the term “litigation explosion” first appeared in print in 1970 and attributing it to
Justice Macklin Fleming of the California Court of Appeals); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment:
Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985 (2003) (“The contemporary perception of a crisis in the judicial
system first became prominent in the 1970s”); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69
MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (discussing the “litigation explosion”); Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and
Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465 (1984) (same); Maurice Rosenberg,
Devising Procedures That are Civil to Promote Justice That is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 801 (1970-1971)
(referring to “glutted calendars and mobbed courtrooms; the unconscionable delays, alternating with rush-rushrush; the mistreatment of jurors and witnesses; the excessive expense; [and] the tarnished image of justice for
millions of Americans”); Alan O. Sykes, Cases, Courts and Congestion in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 327,
328 (Nader, ed. 1969) (“Part of the difficulty in getting rid of court congestion appears to be … [that] it is not
simply an accidental defect of the law, but is rooted in some of the legal system’s most cherished
characteristics.”).
10
Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31
VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); C. RONALD ELLINGTON, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE (1979).
11
See Warren Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211 (1971); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RIGHTS 1 (1975).
Two other reform currents may merit mention here. First, it was during this decade that prohibitions on
advertising by lawyers were lifted. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Russell G. Pierce & Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084
(November 1983). Second, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was created in 1969 when the
American Bar Association grouped and adopted nearly 50 canons from various state bar associations. See
generally Jason J. Kilborn, Who’s in Charge Here?: Putting Clients in Their Place, 37 GA. L. REV. 1 (2002).
12
See, e.g., Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1001 & n.16 (1978-1979)
(“Our legal system has taken too literally the ancient maxim, ‘de minimis non curat lex.’”) (quoting REGINALD
HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 41 (1924)); Laura Nader and Linda R. Singer, Law in the Future: What are
the Choices? Dispute Resolution…, 51 CALIF. ST. B. J. 281 (July 1976); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, SOME
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1973); Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant
Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the World-Wide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L.
REV. 181 (1978); Russell G. Pearce, Patrick W. Shea & Jeffrey W. Stempel, An Assessment of Alternative
Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122 (1980); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATIONAMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION SURVEY ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (Barbara Curran, Rptr., 1976);
Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979) (bemoaning “the persistent inaccessibility of judicial relief for
poor and middle-class people”).
13
See, e.g., Raymond G. Leffler, Dispute Settlement Within Close Corporations, 31 ARB. J. 254 (1976);
Timothy S. Hardy & R. Mason Cargill, Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why Not Arbitrate?, 34 FED.
B.J. 1 (1975); __ Haltzmann, The Value of Arbitration and Mediation in Resolving Community and Racial
Disputes Affecting Business, 29 BUS. LAW. 1005 (1974); Will Lawyering Strangle Democratic Capitalism?,
REGULATION, Mar./Ap. 1978 at 15; ARBITRATION-COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS (A.
Widiss, ed. 1979); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigaiton: Case Management, TwoStage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 253 (1985); Deborah R.
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal
System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 181 (2003) (discussing the early effort of the business community in “getting
to yes and getting rid of juries”).
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Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice.14 This extraordinary event brought together three
hundred conferees from the bench, bar and academia.15 The varied agendas
of this crowd adumbrated dozens of problems ranging from diversity
jurisdiction and the prosecution of victimless crimes to the right to a jury
trial and the dearth of empirical research.16 The conference “arous[ed] a
new spirit of zeal for fundamental procedural reform” and endorsed
innovation.17
Our own great hope for the Pound Conference is that it will be remembered in
the year 2000 not simply as a lively colloquium of experts but as the occasion
when, under the strong leadership of the Chief Justice, Twentieth Century law
reform in the United States really got under way. For this reason, we invite the
reader’s particular attention to the reports of the Pound Conference Follow-Up
Task Force, which appear at pages 295-336 of this book…. The campaign for
procedural improvement must be waged on many fronts, and the reports of the
Task Force provide a unique and valuable map of the terrain as well as the
first practical step, and a highly encouraging one, towards the attainment of
Agenda 2000 A.D.18

14
The conference adopted the precise title of Roscoe Pound’s 1906 indictment at the American Bar
Association’s annual meeting St. Paul, Minnesota. Pound had then criticized the “sporting theory of justice,” “our
exaggerated contentious procedure,” and “our archaic system of courts.” Pound’s speech was a catalyst for reform
efforts leading ultimately to the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act and uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, ___ (1987). The 1976 conference, which has come to be known as The
Pound Conference, symbolically was also held in St. Paul, Minnesota. Chief Justice Burger proudly stated that
The Pound Conference was addressing the “‘unfinished business’ placed on the American Agenda by Pound’s
1906 speech. Warren E. Burger, Preface in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE
5, 5 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). See generally Symposium, The Impact of Mediation: 25
Years After the Pound Conference, 17 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 527-712 (2002).
15
According to the published list, approximately 60% of the conferees were judges or court administrators;
fewer than 10% were law professors; and about 15% were various representatives of the American Bar
Association. Conferees haled from 48 of the 50 states (and also from Puerto Rico and American Samoa). I
fantasize that the State of Montana was purposely excluded in an effort to spite the legacy of Thomas J. Walsh,
the noble senator therefrom who for nearly two decades almost single-handedly blocked the adoption of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, ___ (1987). Alas there is probably some stock
explanation. (West Virginia, too, appears to have had no representative in attendance.)
16
Robert H. Bork, Dealing With the Overload in Article III Courts in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 150 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (advocating for
the abolition of diversity jurisdiction); Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts? in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 51 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979)
(inviting the legislative branch to reexamine the possibility of decriminalizing dunkenness, prostitution, and
gambling); Walter Schaefer, Is the Adversary System Working in Optimal Fashion? in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 171 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (suggesting that
trial by jury in civil cases has no contemporary justification); Laura Nader, Commentary in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 114 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979)
(emphasizing the absence of important data).
17
William T. Gossett et al., Foreword, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE
FUTURE 7, 15 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). Cf. John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound’s St. Paul
Address of 1906, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 176, 176 (1936) (crediting Pound’s speech as “the spark that
kindled the white flame of high endeavor, now spreading through the entire legal profession”).
18
William T. Gossett, Bernard G. Segal and Chesterfield Smith, Foreword in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 7, 15 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
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The papers presented at the conference were published in a bound volume
entitled The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future.19 The
title’s upbeat and reformist tone is revealing in light of the title of the
conference itself.20
Professor Frank Sander’s speech at the Pound Conference, entitled
Varieties of Dispute Processing, envisioned “by the year 2000 not simply a
court house but a Dispute Resolution Center, where the grievant would first
be channelled [CQ] through a screening clerk who would then direct him to
the process (or sequence of processes) most appropriate to his type of
case.”21 Sander suggested that dispute resolution required a flexible and
diverse panoply of processes to meet the systematic needs of entire
categories of certain types of cases and also the unique circumstances
presented in particular cases.22 Although he did not himself then use the
phrase “multi-door courthouse,” such is the frequent characterization of his
ideal.23 Moreover, his remarks are often credited as marking the birth of the
modern ADR movement.24
The ADR movement found traction because it intertwined threads of the
political left25 and right,26 responded to a genuine problem within the legal
19
THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1979).
20
Query whether Pound’s reforms might have been more warmly embraced and more promptly enacted, had
the title of his speech “Causes for Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice” enjoyed the benefit
of such handlers. See generally John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound’s St. Paul Address of 1906: The Spark that
Kindles the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 176 (1937). With regard to the delay, see
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, ___ (1987).
21
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
22
See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 72-79 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (outlining criteria for
determining how particular disputes might best be resolved). See also Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of
Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & SOC. REV. 217 (1973).
23
See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 331 & nn. 110 & 111
(1996). Professor Stempel points out that Sander used the term in a subsequent article. Id. (citing Frank E.A
Sander, The Multi-Door Courthouse, NATIONAL FORUM, Vol. LXIII, No. 4, Fall 1983).
24
See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice,
3 NEV. L.J. 289, 289 & n.3 (Winter 2002/2003); Developments, The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1851, 1853 & n.9 (2000); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s Grid,
3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door
Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
297, 309 (1996); E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS 3-4, 29 (1996); Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law:
Hierarchy and pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5-6
(1993); Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion—The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8 WINDSOR Y.B. OF
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 269 (1988); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 n.17 (1986).
25
See generally, Ralph Nader, Consumerism and Legal Services: The Merging of Movements, 11 LAW &
SOC. REV. 247, 255 (1976) (“The [legal] system must be designed to encourage the non-legal resolution of
disputes, and public participation in planning processes, as well as more traditional legal activity like litigation.”);
William H. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 384-87 (1985);
Laurence H. Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice, THE ATLANTIC, July 1979 at 25; FORD FOUNDATION,
MEDIATING SOCIAL CONFLICT 4 (1978) (third-party intervention efforts supported by Ford Foundation include
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profession,27 and resonated with a changing sociopolitical culture.28
Litigants of all types had a new forum for dispute resolution.29 Courts had
competition.30 The academy had a new discipline.31 And the rhetoric of
mediation, arbitration, facilitiation, fact-finding, and conciliation); FORD FOUNDATION, CURRENT INTERESTS OF
FORD FOUNDATION: 1978 AND 1979 6-7 (“The [Ford] Foundation plans to support investigations of new
ways of settling disputes that may be more equitable, cheaper, and less divisive than the adversary process.”).
26
Chief Justice Burger and others viewed ADR as a mechanism for lightening the caseload of judges. See,
e.g, Warren Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-77 (1982) (advocating private binding
arbitration as “a better way to do it”); Derek Bok, The President’s Report to the Board of Overseers of Harvard
College, 1981-1982, reprinted in N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1983, at 8, and N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1983, at 31; Cannon,
Contentious and Burdensome Litigation: A Need for Alternatives, 63 NAT’L FORUM, Fall 1983, at 10; Ehrlich,
Legal Pollution, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 8, 1976, at 17, 21; Footlick, Too Much Law?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977,
at 42, 47; Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 780 (1977); Rosenberg, Let’s
Everybody Litigate?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1360-63 (1972); Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1979, at 25. Owen Fiss wrote that Chief Justice Burger was not “moved by love, or by a desire to
find new ways to restore or preserve loving relationships, but rather by concerns of efficiency and politics. He
seeks alternatives to litigation in order to reduce the caseload of the judiciary or, even more plausibly, to insulate
the status quo from reform by the judiciary.” Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accomplis, Failed
Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 344 (1996) (“ADR’s biggest boosters
are commercial organizations, employers, insurers, political conservatives and Republicans.”).
Another reform current bears mention here. The year 1976 also brought the Court’s decision in Mathews v.
Eldredge, reflecting a certain diminution in the guarantees of due process. See generally Jerry Mashaw, The
Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
27
ABA REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR DISPUTES RESOLUTION 11-12 (May 1977);
Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950 (1979).
THE

28

Alternative dispute settlement agencies have emerged, I believe, because there is, in the United States, a
growing feeling of dissatisfaction with, and a more critical attitude towards, professionals, an increasing
consciousness that American and Americans must recapture a sense of ‘community,’ and a growing feeling
that individuals must play a more active role in determining how their lives are to be lived. Mediation centers
and similar agencies are, to a large extent, a response to these concerns.

David N. Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 209 (1978)
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (examining
society’s evolving expectations of courts and judges).
See generally Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much Better
Than I Thought, 3 Nev. L.J. 196, __ (Winter 2002/2003) (suggesting that the commonality of procedural reform
movements include: “(1) obvious defects in the existing procedural systems; (2) agendas of the legal profession;
(3) conservative ideology; and (4) liberal ideology”); Linda R. Singer, A Pioneer’s Perspective: Future Looks
Bright, But Challenges Include Retaining Our Core Values, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2000, at 26-27 (“The
[Pound] Conference coalesced the interests of those who focused on access and participation or voice with those
who focused on costs and efficiency. Those interests have coexisted, somewhat uneasily, in the field ever since
and have helped to shape the dispute resolution profession that has grown up as a result.”)
29
For example, the Center for Public Resources (CPR) was founded in 1979 with support from private
foundations and memberships of in-house and firm counsel of the country’s largest companies. CPR’s mission is
to promote innovation and excellence in methods of alternative dispute resolution. Approximately 4000
companies (800 parent companies, on behalf of themselves and their combined 3200 subsidiaries) have subscribed
to the CPR Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation, obligating them to explore the use of ADR
in disputes with other signers. Similarly, approximately 1,500 law firms have signed the CPR Law Firm Policy
Statement on Alternatives to Litigation, committing them to counsel their clients about ADR options. See
http://www.cpradr.org/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
30
Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 47-48
(1987) (exploring the competitive aspects of the relationship between ADR and publicly financed courts”).
ADR was quickly viewed as part of the solution to many categories of cases. See, e.g., Ronald L. Goldfarb
& Linda R. Singer, Redressing Prisoners’ Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175; Raymond G. Leffler, Dispute
Settlement Within Close Corporations, 31 ARB. J. (n.s.) 254 (1976); Andrew J. Nocas, Arbitration of Medical
Malpractice Claims, 13 FORUM 254 (1977); Comment, Nontraditional Remedies for the Settlement of Consumer
Disputes, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 385 (1976); Symposium, The Value of Arbitration and Mediation in Resolving
Community and Racial Disputes Affecting Business, 29 BUS. LAW. 1005 (1974); Note, Arbitration of Attorney Fee
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peaceful problem-solving offered a quixotic escape from all of that which
plagued formal adjudication.32 At the time of Sander’s speech there already
existed a broad array of proposed and experimental models of alternative
dispute resolution33 But Sander elevated these various methods of dispute
Disputes: New Direction for Professional Responsibility, 5 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 309 (1976); Timothy S.
Hardy & R. Mason Cargill, Resolving Government Contract Disputes: Why Not Arbitrate?, 34 FED. B.J. 1 (1975);
Matthew W. Finkin, The Arbitration of Faculty Status Disputes in Higher Education, 30 SW. L.J. 389 (1976).
31
See, e.g., DEAN PRUITT & JEFFREY RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT (1986); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS (1986); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); GARY BELLOW
& BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: NEGOTIATION (1981); HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE,
THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR: PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS (1977); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM C.
URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); P. H. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND
NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1979); DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981);
STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1996);
Carrie Menkel Meadow, Review Essay, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM.
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 905.
See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
235 (1979); E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN
THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); E. Allen Lind et
al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953 (1990); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1995); Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26, 38-42 (Kenneth Arrow, Robert H. Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky & Robert
Wilson eds., 1999).
Of course the new discipline ultimately found its way into the classroom.
Even law schools, until recent years, have provided little or no training in negotiation skills. How strange!
The lawyer’s major revenue-producing activity is negotiating. Only very recently have such courses begun to
appear on the curriculum of even the best law schools. Just this year, West Publishing Company added a
casebook on the subject to its American Casebook Series: The Lawyer as a Negotiator by Professor Harry T.
Edwards of Harvard and James J. White of Michigan (1977).

Robert Coulson, New Dimensions in Dispute Settlement for the Lawyer in THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION’S WIDE WORLD OF ARBITRATION: AN ANTHOLOGY 188, 189 (Charlotte Gold and Susan
Mackenzie, eds.) (1978); Robert B. Moberly, Introduction: Dispute Resolution in the Law School Curriculum:
Opportunities and Challenges, 50 FLA. L. REV. 583, 585-86 (1998) (suggesting that almost all law schools offer
at least one, and often multiple courses in dispute resolution). Professor Michael Moffitt at the University of
Oregon School of Law maintains on behalf of the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution a list
of the dispute resolution course offerings at all American law schools. See http://www.law.uoregon.edu/aba/ (last
visited Nov. 9, 2004).
Today, of course, there are many excellent casebooks devoted exclusively to these fields of study. See, e.g.,
CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHENIDER & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL (2004); STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A.
SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PROCESSES (4th ed. 2003); ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS (3rd ed. 2002); E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K.
HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS (1996).
32
See, e.g., Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and
to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 833-39 (1998) (arguing that
increased use of mediation may elevate legal practice); see also Frances McGovern, Beyond Efficiency: A Bevy of
ADR Justifications (An Unfootnoted Summary), DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at 12, 13; cf. GABRIEL A.
ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 110 (1965) (arguing that cultural factors shape political institutions).
33
See Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR: The Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lecture, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL.
3, 4 (“Obviously, we didn’t invent mediation, we didn’t invent arbitration. But, by common agreement, it was in
about 1975 that the current interest in ADR began. The first period, I think, was about 1975 to 1982. I call it, ‘Let
a thousand flowers bloom.’ There were many experiments….”). ADR mechanisms then in practice included
neighborhood justice centers, rejuvenated small claims courts, arbitration, mediation, ombudsmen, and even
reconceptualized state and federal agencies. See Daniel McGillis, Minor Dispute Processing: A Review of Recent
Developments, in ROMAN TOMASIC & MALCOLM FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT OF AN
EMERGING IDEA 60, 64 (1982) (recounting how, in the 1960s, local communities established neighborhood justice
centers to provide facilitative dispute resolution services for neighbors, families, tenants, and consumers); DANIEL
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resolution from their shadowy adjunct and ancillary status to a legitimate
alternative primary process for the resolution of certain disputes.34 Charting
a spectrum of available processes from formal adjudication, at one end,
through mediation and negotiation at the other end, Sander emphasized that
the critical issue was determining, for a particular conflict, the “appropriate
dispute resolution process.”35
Notwithstanding a vocal and persistent chorus of disquietude,36 ADR
has expanded to become something of a court of general civil jurisdiction.37
No longer a niche product for certain commercial and labor law cases,38
MCGILLIS & JOAN MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS (Nat’l
Inst. L. Enforcement & Crim. Just. No. J-LEAA-030-76, 1977); DAVIS S. GOULD, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
CONSUMER JUSTICE, STAFF STUDIES ON SMALL CLAIMS COURTS (1972) (documenting success of small claims
courts); Thomas L. Eovaldi & Joan E. Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress, 66 NW. U. L.
REV. 281, 302-12 (1971) (discussing arbitration and mediation of consumer claims); Mary Gardiner Jones &
Barry B. Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357 (1972) (same); Wexler, Court-Ordered Consumer Arbitration, 28 ARB. J. 175 (1973)
(same); Maurice Rosenberg & Myra Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in
Pennsylvania, 7
4 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1961) (same); George King, The Consumer Ombudsman, 79 COM. L.J. 355
(1974) (__); Eric H. Steele, Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1107 (1975) (__); David A. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer
Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1968) (__); NATIONAL ASSOC. OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMM.
ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 4-5 (1973) (__);
Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote Justice that is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV.
797 (1971) (___); Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal
Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1973).
See generally E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
STRATEGIES FOR LAW AND BUSINESS 29 (1996) (suggesting that ADR is “Not a new or even recent development,”
and citing decision of King Solomon, Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, and use of arbitration and mediation to
resolve trade and labor disputes). See also n. __, supra.
34
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 80 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
35
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
Commentators have since adopted this appellation of the “ADR” acronym. See, e.g., Albie M. Davis &
Howard Gadlin, Mediators Gain Trust the Old-Fashioned Way—We Earn It!, 4 NEGOT. J. 55, 62 (1988);
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 6 at n.* (4th ed. 2003); Janet Reno, Lawyers as
Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the AALS, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 8 (1999) (urging lawyers to engage in
“appropriate dispute resolution”); LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
LAWYERS 51 (2d ed. 1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2689-90 (1995) (urging that appropriate
should replace alternative in describing mediation and other nontrial dispute resolution processes). Of all the
credit heaped upon Professor Sander for his 1976 speech, I find it surprising that he has not also justly received
the credit for inventing the term “appropriate dispute resolution.” In any event, upon my reading of the tea leaves
and the contemporary scholarship, it appears that “CDR” (“complementary dispute resolution”) is the next
iteration. See n. __ infra and accompanying text.
36
The bibliographies cited in n. __, infra, collect the relevant sources.
37
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1997) (noting that arbitration has “moved from the role of commercial court to that of a civil court of
general jurisdiction.”). See also Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and Death of
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 186 (2003) (suggesting that ADR has “creat[ed] a ‘new’ civil
procedure”).
38
See, e.g., GABRIEL M. WILNER, 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3 (1999); Christine Lepera &
Jeannie Costello, New Areas in ADR, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: WHAT THE BUSINESS LAWYER
NEEDS TO KNOW 593, 610 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-605, 1999). Employers
are attracted to ADR for its facilitation of preventive management. See, e.g., John E. Sands & Sam Margulies,
ADR in Employment Law: The Concept of Zero Litigation, N.J. LAW., Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 23, 23-24 (discussing
the fit between “new” management structures and ADR in addressing employment-related conflicts).
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ADR now commands attention in all sectors of the economy39 and in
virtually every segment of society.40
39
In a 1997 Price Waterhouse survey of the “Fortune 1000” companies, nearly all of the 530 respondents
had used some form of ADR, and ninety percent classified ADR as a “critical cost control technique.” Jack M.
Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998). For a detailed report on corporate use of ADR, see David B.
Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J. Feb. 1999, at 66, 66-71.
A review of recent literature indicates the expansion of ADR in antitrust, see, e.g., Howard Adler, Jr. &
Richard Chernick, The Expanding Role of ADR in Antitrust Cases, 9 No. 2 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 34 (Winter 2003);
entertainment, see, e.g., Symposium, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Entertainment Industry, 4 CARDOZO
ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1-___ (October 23, 2002); Peter A. Carfagna, “Show Me the Money:” In Lucrative
Sports Contracts, an ADR Clause Makes All the Difference, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 9 (2002); MARGERY HOLMAN,
DICK MORIARTY & JANICE FORSYTH, SPORTS, FITNESS AND THE LAW: NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES __-__
(2nd ed. 2001) (chapter on ADR in Sports Law); Gerald F. Phillips, Entertainment Industry is Accepting ADR, 21
No. 1 ENT. L. REP. 5 (1999); health care, see, e.g., Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life
Decision-Making I, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2004); Phyllis E. Bernard, Mediating With an 800-Pound
gorilla: Medicare and ADR, 60 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1417 (2003); John W. Cooley, A Dose of ADR for the
Health Care Industry, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 16 (Feb.-Apr. 2002); Bryan A. Lian, ADR in Health Care: An Overview
of the ADR Landscape in HEALTH CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MANUAL 3:1 – 3:43 (2000); construction, see, e.g.,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOC. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (INCLUDING
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) (2000); CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, CPR MODEL ADR
PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ADR (1994); HIBBERD & NEWMAN, ADR AND
ADJUDICATION IN CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES (1999); natural resources, see, e.g., Eileen B. Vernon, Arbitration in
the Energy/Minerals Field: Customizing the Clause, 56-J AN DISP. RESOL. J. 50 (Nov. 2001/Jan. 2002); P. Jean
Baker, ADR Assists Energy Industry Restructuring, DISP. RESOL. J. 9 (Feb. 1999); intellectual property, see, e.g.,
Manny D. Pokotilow, Why Alternative Dispute Resolution Should be Used for Intellectual Property Disputes, 16
No. 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 17 (July 2004); Kevin M. Lemley, I’ll Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: A
Proposed Model for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 AKRON L. REV. 287
(2004); Rodney C. Kyle, Arbitration Makes Sense in International Intellectual Property Disputes, 56-J AN DISP.
RESOL. J. 30 (Nov. 2001/Jan. 2002); Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Commercial Intellectual Property Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1716 (1998) (arguing that ADR is an
effective means of resolving disputes that involve “shared rights” and for which an “either/or result in which one
party walks away with all the rights at issue” is ill-suited); Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Using Alternative Dispute
Resolution to Resolve Patent Litigation: A Survey of Patent Litigators, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 77, 84
(1999); telecommunications, see, e.g., Lori Tripoli, Telecommunications Act Offers Opportunity for ADR
Advocates, INSIDE LITIG., Mar. 1997, at 3, 3 (reporting that the CPR Institute’s Telecommunications Group is
recommending ADR to state agencies that must implement the Telecommunications Act of 1996); and technology
industries, see, e.g., William F. Baron, High- Tech/High Resolution: ADR in Technology Disputes, DISP. RESOL.
J., Apr. 1996, at 88, 90 (noting characteristics of ADR amenable to technology disputes).
Not surprisingly, certain of these growth areas have proven especially controversial. See, e.g., Clyde W.
Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 685 (2004); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts:
A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Sarah R. Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does
Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759 (2001); Sidney Charlotte Reynolds, Closing a Discrimination
Loophole: Using Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision to Prevent Employers from Requiring Unlawful
Arbitration Agreements as Conditions of Continued Employment, 76 WASH. L. REV. 957 (__); Ronald Turner,
Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the
Individual Worker’s Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135 (2000); Jean R. Sternlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment
of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.REV. 1 (1997); Michael D. Donovan
& David A. Searles, Preserving Judicial Recourse for Consumers: How to Combat Overreaching Arbitration
Clauses, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 269 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in
Alternative Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19 (1999).
40
The Better Business Bureau, for example, may be the most familiar dispute resolution program. See __
KING & __ MCEVOY, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE COMPLAINT-HANDLING PROCEDURES USED BY CONSUMERS
(1976) (Nat’l Technical Information Serv., U.S. Commerce Dep’t) (finding the Better Business Bureau more
familiar to consumers than 19 of 21 public and private organizations; only the Post Office and the Social Security
Administration were better known). Trade associations and county, city and state-sponsored consumer affairs
offices also often offer dispute resolution services. See generally Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of
Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1003
- 04 & n.25 (1978-1979).
The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has formed special panels from time to time to deal with
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ADR has clearly arrived in a big way. Many, if not most, federal and state
jurisdictions include ADR methods in their court rules. Federal and state
administrative agencies are increasingly relying on non-litigious methods to
resolve disputes. More and more, disputants are required to use mediation or
another form of ADR, rather than just being offered the opportunity to use it if
they so desire. Today, it is clear that far more disputes in the United States are
resolved through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration than through trial.41

Providing ADR has, itself, become a cottage industry.42 And in cyberspace,
disputes are resolved through ADR43—even if we have yet to appreciate
particular phenomena: forming a claims resolution program at the request of the Florida Department of Insurance
following the devastation of southern Florida by Hurricane Andrew in 1992; constituting a National Technology
Panel in 1998 to address issues arising from the “Y2K Problem” which then loomed as a potential threat;
establishing in 2000 a panel for the USA Track and Field doping arbitration program. AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC SERVICE AT THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 8-9 (2004). Other arbitration panels of
general interest may include the Tribunal Arbitral du Sport, which recently adjudicated the Olympic medal
controversy between gymnasts Paul Hamm and Yang Tae Young. See http://www.tas-cas.org/ (CAS 2004/A/704
Yang Tae Young v. International Gymnastics Federation) (last visited November 10, 2004).
Perhaps the largest effort at private dispute resolution was the formation of the Asbestos Claims Facility.
This was an entity created with the assistance of Dean Emeritus Harry Wellington, on behalf of manufacturers of
asbestos and their insurers , to facilitate prompt disputes between and among producers and insurers. See
generally Harry Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of A Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375
(1984-85); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted
or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1. 14 & n.56 (1991); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry,
Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 438 (1986) (suggesting
optimism at early stages of program).
For a range of other social applications of ADR, see, e.g., T. Nikki Eckland, The Safe Schools Act: Legal
and ADR Responses to Violence in Schools, 31 URB. LAW. 309 321-22 (1999); Nathan K. DeDino, Note, When
Fences Aren’t Enough: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve Disputes Between Neighbors, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 887 (2003); Scott E. Mollen, Alternative Dispute Resolution of Condominium and
Cooperative Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 75 (1999).
41
Jean R. Sternlight, ADR is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice, 3 NEV.
L.J. 289, 290-91 (Winter 2002/2003) (citing The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 65158, 652(a) (requiring each district court to have litigants in all civil cases consider using ADR, and to provide at
least one ADR process to litigants); NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY
PRACTICE app. B (1999 & Supp. 2000) (listing territory, state, and federal legislation on mediation); Jeffrey M.
Senger, Turning the Ship of State, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 79 (listing federal agencies utilizing various ADR
processes, including the U.S. Postal Service, federal Justice Department, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and the Air Force); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1339, 1340-41).
Arbitration is sweeping across the American legal landscape and is fundamentally reshaping the manner in
which disputes are resolved in our legal system. Simply stated, arbitration is everywhere. Virtually all
American businesses and individuals with legal capacity to contract (and some who clearly lack such
capacity) have entered into agreements that specify arbitration as the forum for resolving most or all disputes
that might arise between the parties.”

Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit, 35 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 497, 499 (2004).
42
A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 248
(1985); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH,
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 33-62 (1996).
43
See generally Aashit Shah, Using ADR to Resolve Online Disputes, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2004);
COLIN RULE, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS (2002); Frank A. Cona, Focus on Cyberlaw:
Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 975 (1997); Richard Michael
Victorio, Internet Dispute Resolution (iDR): Bringing ADR into the 21st Century, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 279
(2001); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms of ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 675 (2000); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet
Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151 (2000); Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros and Cons of Online
Dispute Resolution: An Assessment of Cyber-Mediation Websites, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2003).
The Center for Information Technology and Dispute Resolution (CITDR) at the University of Massachusetts
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fully what and where cyberspace is.44 The increasing incidence of
transnational disputes has likewise fueled the ADR boom.45
Reference to a system of ADR could be misleading in its simplicity
since there is, in fact, a constellation of different ADR mechanisms that can
vary dramatically in form, substance and purpose.46 Generally speaking,
however, I draw conclusions based on the similarities of those mechanisms
rather than their differences.47 As Professor Resnik described in a similar
context, “I am interested in the interaction of two generic modes of dispute
resolution, one styled ‘adjudication’ and one styled ‘alternative dispute
resolution’—even as we know that both are constructs, with internal
distinctions, a variety of expressions, and a good deal of overlap.”48 At this
initial stage in my argument, then, I am content to have simply outlined the

supports and sustains the development of information technology applications as a means for better understanding
and managing conflict. As part of this effort they maintain a list of profit and nonprofit ADR projects and ventures
that provide online dispute resolution services. As of October 19, 2004, over 50 projects were enumerated. See
http://www.ombuds.org/center/onlineadr.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). See also //www.odr.info/providers.php
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
44
See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Paul
Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as
Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 447-48 (2003).
45
See, e.g., First Global Research Facility Dedicated to ADR Launched, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1999, at 4, 4;
Betty Southard Murphy, ADR’s Impact on International Commerce, DISP. RESOL. J., Dec. 1993, at 68, 69.
Because some foreign courts refuse to hear technology and Internet cases, ADR is the only recourse in these
situations. See Lepera & Costello, supra note __, at 600.
Researchers report widespread dissatisfaction among Mexican and Canadian disputants, with more than 50
sets of laws that must be managed in U.S. litigation, and indicate that the availability of ADR has significantly
improved the international free trade climate. Mediation is also more compatible with cultural biases in Canada
and Mexico against litigation. See L. Richard Freese, Jr. & Robert Sagnola, New Challenges in International
Commercial Disputes: ADR Under NAFTA, COLO. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 61, 62.
46
See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 4-5 (4th ed. 2003) (offering a useful
table comparing and contrasting various methods of dispute resolution, including arbitration, mediation,
negotiation, private judging, neutral expert fact-finding, minitrial, ombudsman, and summary jury trial); see also
id. at 287-94 (describing various innovative forms of arbitration, including final offer arbitration, high-low
arbitration, and mediation-arbitration (“med-arb”)); id. at 303-04 (discussing early neutral evaluation); Cary
Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rule-Making, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255
(1997) (evaluating regulation negotiation (“reg-neg”)).
For extensive bibliographies describing and evaluating the myriad processes and implications of ADR, see
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 691-755, 761-82 (4th ed. 2003); ALAN SCOTT
RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
1007-18 (3rd ed. 2002)
47
See generally, __, Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 906 (1979) (“‘Alternative dispute resolution’ is a
label ascribed to an increasingly broad range of options that share few characteristics aside from their common
departure from traditional courtroom procedures.”).
There are occasions where distinctions are necessary. See, e.g., nn. ___, infra, and accompanying text.
Of course one should also note that the form, substance and processes of “formal adjudication” can also
vary. Consider, for example, the differences between small claims court and the United States Supreme Court. See
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN
THE FUTURE 65, 69-70 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
48
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 256 (1995) (citing: Lauren K. Robel, Private Justice and the Federal Bench, 68 Ind.
L. Rev. 891, 895-96 (1993) (the “privatization continuum”); Galanter & Lande, supra, at 399-400 (charting the
“dimensions of privatization”)).
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emergence of a system of ADR that is resolving many types of disputes,
and in large numbers.
II. THE ECHOES OF EQUITY IN ADR
In its most ambitious form, ADR presents an alternative paradigm of
dispute resolution. ADR proponents espouse a larger and less traditional
view of lawyering skills, criticize the physical and financial barriers to
justice, and focus attention upon the drawbacks of the judicial process—the
needless complication of issues, the unidimensional character of adversarial
representation, the excessive costs and delays, and the sporting theory of
justice.49 They envision a complete restructuring of the adjudicatory
framework and a reeducation not only of lawyers and other professionals,
but also of the general public about the ideals of justice and the methods of
dispute resolution.50
This Part draws attention to the characteristics of equity that inhere in
that alternative system of ADR. To be sure, comparing two regimes as
protean and multi-dimensional as equity and ADR without overgeneralizing or caricaturing either, and without cherry-picking the best
analogues and avoiding the complexities, can be difficult. I have attempted
to minimize those risks by focusing here on abstractions of the two systems
rather than on either system’s constituent parts. For the most part these
abstractions also consider the systems of ADR and Equity in their pure,
original forms.51 The observations made in this Part are purposely
uncritical, if not somewhat superficial. A more thorough analysis of the
relationships between and among the systems of ADR and formal
adjudication, on one hand, and the systems of Law and Equity, on the other,
follows in subsequent Parts. That later discussion also addresses the
evolution and perversion of these analogous “alternative” systems.
A. Locating a Jurisprudence
As a threshold matter, the word equity requires clarification. There are
at least three definitions of equity and, to some extent, all are implicated
here. One popular meaning of equity invokes a collection of eternal and
universal principles that captures all that which is moral, right, just and
49
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 4 (1989); Thomas E. Carbonneau, A Consideration of Alternatives to Divorce
Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 606-07, 612-15.
50
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 4 (1989).
51
Moreover, mining the history of Equity relies heavily on incomplete pictures painted by secondary
sources, making all conclusions somewhat tentative. .See generally JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO
BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (Oxford 2001).
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good.52 In the broadest understanding of this view, equity is ethical rather
than jural.53 Grounded in the precepts of the conscience, this notion of
equity includes such mandates as gratitude, kindness, and charity, and thus
extends well beyond the reach of positive law.54
A second, similar meaning sometimes given to equity makes equity
synonymous with “natural law.” 55 In this view equity is the soul and spirit
of all law56—the moral standard to which all law should conform.57 In this
sense equity, the “real law,”58 has a place in every rational system of
jurisprudence, if not in name, at least in substance.59
52
See generally Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of “Equity” (Epiekia), 18 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 119 (1942-1943); MAX HAMBRUGER, MORALS AND LAW: THE GROWTH OF ARISTOTLE’S LEGAL THEORY
(1965); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF VIRTUE (1989).
Interestingly, this definition of equity has slowly fallen out of contemporary discourse. Compare BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 634 (4th ed. 1951) with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 484-85(5 th ed. 1979); BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1980); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 560 (7th ed. 1999); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 57980 (8th ed. 2004).
53
NORMAN FETTER, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1-2 (1895).
54
JOSIAH W. SMITH, A MANUAL OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 3-4 (1st American Edition from the 9th London
Edition 1871).
55
See Walter Wheeler Cook, Equity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 582 (1931) (“The most
common of the non-technical meanings of equity, one in which lawyers themselves not infrequently use the word,
is as a synonym for ‘natural justice.’”)
56
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.. . p. 429. It is with this meaning of the word that French
jurists have said: “L’equité est l’esprit de nos lois”; and a Roman jurist said “Æquitas est honestas.”
57
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 45 at 45-46 (2d ed. 1892);
58
Joseph H. Beale, Equity in America, 1 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 25 (“[T]he doctrines of equity represent the
real law, and when a Court of law insists on applying its own views as against the views of equity, it is not getting
at the real substantial rights of the parties.”).
59
See “1 FONBLANGUE EQUITY, B. 1, § 3, p.24, note (h); PLOWDEN, COMM. p. 465, 466. Lord Bacon said in
his Argument on the jurisdiction of the Marches, there is no law under heaven which is not supplied with equity;
for summum jus summar injuria; or as some have it, summa lex summa crux. And, therefore, all nations have
equity. 4 BAC. WORKS, p. 274. Plowden, in his note to his Reports, dwells much (p. 465, 466) on the nature of
equity in the interpretation of statutes, saying, Ratio legis est anima legis. And it is a common maxim in the law of
England, that Apices juris non sunt jura BRANCH’S MAXIMS, p. 12; CO. LITT. 304(b).” 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 7 at 6 (12th ed. 1877).
This definition of equity has led some to focus on the commonality of the foundational principles of the
common law and equity. Thus, Blackstone says: “The [common] law is the perfection of reason; it always intends
to conform thereto; and what is not reason is not law.” He then goes on to say: “Not that the particular reason of
every rule in the law can at this distance of time be always precisely assigned; but it is sufficient that there be
nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume it to be well founded.” 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON … p. 70.

The moral law, as such, is not an element of the human law. Whatever be the name under which it is
described,—the moral law, the natural law, the law of nature, the principles of right and justice,—this code
which is of divine origin, and which is undoubtedly compulsory upon all mankind in their personal relations,
is not per se or ex proprio vigore a part of the positive jurisprudence which, under the name of the municipal
law, each independent state has set for the government of its own body politic. This truth, so simple and so
plain, and yet so often forgotten by text-writers and judges, removes at once all doubt and difficulty from a
clear conception of the positive human law, and of its relations with the higher and divine law which we call
morality. Speculative writers upon the natural law may well see in it the foundation of all perfected human
legislation, and it is not surprising that they should confound the two. It is surprising that those who treat of
the human jurisprudence alone, and especially those who administer that jurisprudence, should confound the
commands uttered by the divine Law-giver with those issued by human law-makers. It is true that many of the
precepts of this moral code relate to mankind considered as members of an organized society,—the state,—
and prescribe the obligations which belong to them as component parts of a national body; and therefore these
precepts are jural in their nature and design, and the duties which they impose upon individuals are of the
same kind as those imposed by the human authority of the state. It is also true that human legislation ought to
conform itself to and embody these jural precepts of the moral code; every legislator, whether he legislate in a
Parliament or on the judicial bench, ought to find the source and material of the rules he lays down in these
principles of morality; and it is certain that the progress toward a perfection of development in every
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A third, technical definition of Equity (a meaning typically signified by
use of the capital letter “E”) refers to that system of jurisprudence that was
originally administered by the High Court of Chancery in England.60 The
circularity of this definition requires a brief narration of the scope of the
jurisprudence of Equity.
The system of Equity evolved from the royal prerogative of kings, as the
fountainhead of justice,61 to ensure that justice was administered in each
municipal law consists in its gradually throwing off what is arbitrary, formal, and unjust, and its adopting
instead those rules and doctrines which are in agreement with the eternal principles of right and morality. But
it is no less true that until this work of legislation has been done, until the human law-giver has thus borrowed
the rules of morality, and embodied them into the municipal jurisprudence by giving them a human sanction,
morality is not binding upon the citizens of a state as a part of the law of that state. In every existing
municipal law belonging to a civilized nation, this work of adaptation and incorporation has been performed
to a greater or less degree.

1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 63 at 65-67 (2d ed. 1892).
60
See n. __, infra.
Equity Jurisprudence, in the specific and technical sense of the term, as contradistinguished from natural,
abstract, and universal Equity, and from Law and the Statutory Jurisprudence of the Court of Chancery, may
be described to be a portion of justice or natural Equity, not embodied in legislative enactments or in the rules
of the Common law, yet modified by a due regard thereto, and to the complex relations and convenience of an
artificial state of society, and administered in regard to cases where the particular rights in respect whereof
relief is sought come within some general class of rights enforced at Law, or may be enforced without
detriment or inconvenience to the community, but where, as to such particular rights, the Courts of Law
cannot, or originally did not, clearly afford any relief or adequate relief, at least not without circuity of action
or multiplicity of suits, or cannot make such restrictions, adjustments, compensations, qualifications, or
conditions, as may be necessary in order to take due care of the rights of all who are interested in the property
in litigation.

JOSIAH W. SMITH, A MANUAL OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 2-3 (1st American Ed. from the 9th London Ed. 1871).
See also 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 67 AT 70-71 (2d ed. 1892)
(defining equity as “those doctrines and rules, primary and remedial rights and remedies, which the common law,
by reason of its fixed methods and remedial system, was either unable or inadequate in the regular course of its
development, to establish, enforce, and confer, and which it therefore either tacitly omitted or openly rejected”);
MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF EQUITY 9 (1879) (“The jurisdiction of courts of chancery now extends to
all civil cases proper in good conscience and honesty for relief or aid as to which the procedure of the commonlaw courts is unsuited to give an adequate remedy, or as to which the common-law courts, when able to extend
their aid, have refused to do so.”); CHARLES E. PHELPS, JURIDICAL EQUITY 192 (1894) (“By juridical equity is
meant a systematic appeal fro relief from a cramped administration of defective laws to the disciplined conscience
of a competent magistrate, applying to the special circumstances of defined and limited classes of civil cases the
principles of natural justice, controlled in a measure as well by considerations of public policy as by established
precedent and by positive provisions of law.”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE:
AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 25 AT 18 (12th ed. 1877) (“[E]quity jurisprudence may …
properly be said to be that portion of remedial justice, which is exclusively administered by a court of equity, as
contradistinguished from that portion of remedial justice, which is exclusively administered by a court of common
law.”); GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 1 (11th ed. 1931) (1874) (“[equity] is that system of justice which was
administered by the high court of chancery in England in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction.”); Howard
L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 24 (1951) (“The description of
equity as that law which was administered by the old English courts of Chancery, of course, is hardly a definition.
Yet that is the customary introductory description of equity.”).
61
The king is accordingly both the chosen head of the nation and the lord paramount of the whole land; he is
the source of justice and the ultimate resource in appeal for such equity as he is pleased to dispense; the
supreme judge of his own necessities and the methods to supply them. He is in fact despotic, for there is no
force that can constitutionally control him, or force him to observe conditions to which, for his own security
or for the regular dispatch of business, he may have been pleased to pledge himself.

STUBBS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY § 118 at ___ (___). See also Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity
Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 33 (1951); W__ WALSH, EQUITY c. 1 (1930); George Burton Adams,
The Origin of English Equity, 16 COL. L. REV. 87, 89 (1916); __ TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 91-3, 133
(1937); Bracton, De Legibus, etc., II, ch. 9, 107 b; ch. 10, fol. 108, V; ch. 15, fol. 412, 1, 2, 3. Warren B. Kittle,
Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21, 23 (1919-1920); Colin P.
Campbell, The Court of Equity, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 109 (1903); Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—
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case.62 The Chancellor, who functioned as a secretary to the king and also
as the keeper of the king’s seal and “conscience” administered the king’s
justice by issuing, at his discretion, brevia or writs commanding the
performance or cessation of certain acts.63 The repeated issuance of writs
based upon similar circumstances led to a standardization of that process,
such that the Chancellor’s court could issue the appropriate writ whenever a
complainant presented a certain pattern of facts.64 These writs became the
foundation of the “common law.”65 To the king’s court were added, in turn,
the court of the Exchequer, the court of Common Pleas, and the court of the
King’s Bench—all common law courts, 66 and all approachable only upon
the authority of a writ issued by the Chancery.67
Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21, 21 (1919-1920); Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth
Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934); See Warren B. Kittle, Courts of
Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21, 23 (1919-1920) (“It was the firm
policy of the Norman kings to concentrate all power within themselves.”); 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 85-87 (1895); D.M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL
SKETCH OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 13-14 (1890). The operative principle was that the
king was the fountainhead of all justice, and in him, resided the final power to do whatever was just and righteous.
See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 12–13
(1952); WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 69–70(1923).
62
. Until the latter part of the twelfth century, ordinary law and justice in England was governed by custom
and was administered rather informally (if not crudely) by the shire courts and the courts of the hundred motes (in
the time of Saxons and Danes, dating back to the seventh century) and by the county, borough and manor courts
(in the early Norman period beginning with the Norman Conquest in 1066). The forms of trial were, in large part,
appeals to the supernatural. See generally 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 14-22 (1895); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 40 (7th
ed. 1956); GEORGE L. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 (1948); George Burton Adams, The Origin of English
Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 91 & n.10 (1916) (discussing the king’s “prerogative machinery”); Frederick
Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest 14 L.Q. REV. 291, 297 (1898).
63
. See George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COL. L. REV. 87, 89 (1916) (discussing the
new “judicial machinery” brought into England at the Norman Conquest); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden,
Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760 (1945) (“Justice did open the door, of course,
and it was the royal hand that was on the knob.”); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF
ACTION, 4–5 (Chaytor ed. 1909).
64
This development is generally credited to Henry II (Curtmantle), who reigned from 1154–1189. See
JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (4th ed. 2002); 1 SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 138-46 (1895); WILLIAM F.
WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 2 (1930).
65
See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 49 (4th ed. 2002); WILLIAM F.
WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 86-88 (1930); 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 129-30 (1895); See also JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW
PLEADING 18 (1969) (“Substantive law grew out of procedure. Courts were organized to handle a series of
specific cases, the division of which gradually developed theories of rights and liabilities. Our rights and liabilities
as defined by substantive law, then, had their origin in and developed out of procedural law.”). Of course, it bears
emphasis that the rights that were recognized were almost exclusively property rights; there were no personal
rights, political rights, civil rights as we understand them. See William Q. deFuniak, Origin and Nature of Equity,
23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 56 (1948-1949).
66
Although each of these courts initially had its own proper sphere, these distinctions faded. Generally
speaking, plaintiffs had a choice between the three courts, and each of them dealt with the case in the same way
and by the same rules. These courts administered traditional law and statutes. The phrase “common law” was
borrowed from the canonists—who used jus commune to denote the general law of the Catholic Church. The
common law refers to that part of the law that is unenacted and non-statutory yet common to the whole land and
to all Englishmen. It is contrasted with statute, local custom, and the royal prerogative. When Chancery courts
developed, common law would also be contrasted with equity. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (1909).
67
Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 35- 36 (1951).
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But the common law system became a hard and fast system with certain
clearly defined things which it could do and with equally clearly defined
things which it could not do.68 The universe of writs was fixed and their
construction by law judges narrowly circumscribed;69 precise and technical
rules of pleading, procedure and proof cabined judicial discretion within the
form of action.70 And even for those who could navigate the procedural
minutiae successfully, the remedies which the law courts gave were often
wholly inadequate.71
68
This statement requires some qualification. There is evidence that, in fact, the early “law courts” of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries enjoyed and exercised considerable discretion in the administration of what we
would later be called law and equity. Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244,
246 (1945); H.D. Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity in ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY 261 (Paul
Vinogradoff, ed. 1913); William Searle Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law
Judges to the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1916) (accumulating evidence that
common law judges in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries “administered both law and equity”); Aaron
Friedberg, The Merger of Law and Equity, 12 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 317, 318 n.2 (1938) (“during the reign of Henry
II, both equity and common law were administered under the same system of procedure and were quite
undistinguishable from each other”).The ossification soon followed, however. See George Burton Adams, The
Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 87, 96 (1916). See also William Q. deFuniak, Origin and Nature of
Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 57 (1948-1949) (“A growing worship of formalism and technicality also began to
obsess the courts of law.”).
69
. For example, a provision in Magna Charta (1215) significantly diminished the scope of the royal writ in
respect to titles to land. Also, the Provisions of Oxford (1258) expressly forbade the Chancellor to issue any new
writs “without the commandment of the King and his council who shall be present.” The Provisions were annulled
five years later, but the common law courts nevertheless were transformed during the 13th century into a rigid
system of formal actions. See 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 196 (7th ed. 1956);
2 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 291 (7th ed. 1956); ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR,
CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 (1952) (citing FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION 41 (1936); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
58-59 (7th ed. 1956)). Later, in the reign of Edward the First (1272-1307), Chancery was empowered to issue new
writs to deal with new situations, but met resistance from the common law courts which could, and often did,
throw out the writ as unlawful. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L.
REV. 23, __ (1951). This coincides with the development of the common law courts into an institution that was
separate from the king. See Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244, 246
(1945) (noting independence of common law courts as of the fourteenth century); William Searle Holdsworth, The
Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REV. 293, 294 (1915) (“In the latter half of the 14th and in the 15th centuries
the common law tended to become a fixed and rigid system. It tended to be less closely connected with the king,
and therefore less connected with, and sometimes even opposed to, the exercise of . . . royal discretion.”).
70
. See Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 10, 10-11
(1926)(“In accordance with its technical mode of procedure, every species of legal wrong was supposed to fit into
some one of a limited number of classes; for each class an appropriate remedy was provided, obtainable only by
the use of some one of a limited number of ‘forms of action.’ An action was begun by the issuance of a writ
appropriate to the form of action; in time these writs became standardized, and, where the facts of a case were
without precedent, no writ to cover them was found, and hence no action could be brought.”); George Palmer
Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 30, 31 (1924-1925) (discussing “form-mad common lawyers”);
JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 61–62 (1913)
(referring to the common law’s “formulaic procedure”); William Searle Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity
Administered by the Common Law Judges to the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26 YALE L.J. 1, 22
(1916) (discussing the “complicated machinery” of the law courts).
71
. See ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 17 (1895) (discussing inability
of common law courts to compel the performance of duties); Warren B. Kittle, Courts of law and Equity—Why
They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 28 (1919-1920) (“[T]he remedies which the law courts gave
were often wholly inadequate. They were as bad as no remedy at all.”).

We are thus faced with the startling view of a system of so-called jurisprudence that can interpose only after a
wrong has been done and is impotent to stay the hand of the wrongdoer; which is powerless to compel men to
perform their obligations and can only give damages for their nonperformance; and which cannot take of or
repair the mistakes or omissions that so frequently arise in business affairs. In short, a system of jurisprudence
grossly imperfect and deficient.
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The ossification of the common law made it impossible for many
petitioners to obtain writs appropriate to their peculiar problems. Without
appropriate writs, they could obtain no adequate redress from the common
law courts.72 Yet there remained the royal prerogative.73 Chancery, which
was under the influence of ecclesiastical Chancellors who had some
acquaintance with the aequitas of Roman law and also knowledge of canon
law, ushered in the next stage of development in English law.74
The early ecclesiastical Chancellors thought that it was consistent with belief
in a revealed Word which stressed, among other things, a golden rule, for
them to translate moral and ethical rights into juridical rights, enforced by the
State, through its tribunals, when it was reasonable thus to summon political
sovereignty to the aid of morals, and when the violation of such ethical rights
involved proprietary consequences affecting the common good.75

By the late fourteenth century, a separate Court of Chancery administered
this jurisprudence.76 To minimize its conflict with the common law courts,
William Q. de Funiak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 57 (1948-1949) (citing MERWIN,
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 17 (1895)).
72
Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 36 (1951).
73
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION at 3 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (“Though
these great courts of law have been established (King’s Bench, Common Pleas, etc.) there is still a reserve of
justice in the king.”).
74
See Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 312 (1933); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth
Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760–61 (1945). According to Professor
Glenn, much pomp accompanied the early chancellors when they marched in state. A graphic description appears
in GEORGE CAVENDISH, THE LIFE OF THOMAS WOLSEY (1893), which was written by a gentleman usher of a
chancellor. See also Walter E. Sparks, The Origin, Growth, and Present Scope of Equity Jurisprudence in
England and the United States, 16 W. JURIST 473, 475 (1882) (“From the time of the reign of Henry VI
[chancery] constantly grew in importance, and in the reign of Henry VII it expanded into a broad and almost
boundless jurisdiction under the fostering care and ambitious wisdom and the love of power of Cardinal
Wolsey.”).
75
Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319, 321
n.10 (1935-1936).
76
See Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 10, 11 (1926)
(the “practice of referring to the Chancellor all of these special appeals to the kind led to the establishment of a
tribunal which by the time of Edward III (1327–1377) had become recognized as a distinct and permanent court,
with its separate jurisdiction and mode of procedure and its seat at Westminster”); William Searle Holdsworth,
The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to the Equity Administered by the
Chancellor, 26 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1916) (describing that all cases which called for equity were “handed over to a
tribunal which, in time, came to be perfectly distinct from any of the common law courts”); William F. Walsh,
Equity Prior to the Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 97, 107 (1928-1929) (suggesting that Chancery as a court of
equity was taking form “around the 14th century”); George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COL.
L. REV. 87, 97 (1916) (dating origins of a separate system of equity to the fourteenth century); George Burton
Adams, The Continuity of English Equity, 26 YALE L.J. 550, 556 n.17 (1917) (“The chancellor’s court had
become distinct from the Council before the end of the 15th century.”); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 404 (7th ed. 1956) (suggesting that the Chancellor first made a decree on his own
authority in 1474); Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81,
96 (1934) (“It was not until the end of the fifteenth century that purely equity matters go to the chancellor
alone.”); Walter E. Sparks, The Origin, Growth, and Present Scope of Equity Jurisprudence in England and the
United States, 16 W. JURIST 473, 474 (1882) (quoting the proclamation of 22 Edward III addressed to the sheriffs
of London “commanding them that, whatsoever business relating as well to the common law of our kingdom, as
our special grace, cognizable before us, from henceforth to be prosecuted as followeth; viz., The common law
business before the Archbishop of Canterbury, elect, our chancellor, by him to be dispatched, and the other
matters grantable by our special grace be prosecuted before our special chancellor, or our well beloved clerk, the
keeper of the privy seal, so that they, or one of them, transmit to us such petitions of business which, without
consulting us, they cannot determine, together with their advice thereupon, without any further prosecution to be
had before use for the same.”). In an effort to date the commencement of a court of chancery, it bears mention that

20

Thomas O. Main

11-Mar-05

which were already ordained and established with judges and practitioners
defensive of their jurisdiction,77 Chancery took as the basis of its
jurisdiction the maxim, aequitas agit in personam. By acting in personam,
Chancery could administer complete relief according to conscience and the
principles of natural justice, without reference to the common law or its
courts.78
The Chancellor unrolled a vast body of legal principle to which we now
refer as Equity to offer relief in those cases where, because of the
technicality of procedure, defective methods of proof, and other
shortcomings in the Common Law, there was no “plain, adequate and
complete remedy” otherwise available.79 In this context, plain is the
opposite of “doubtful and obscure.” 80 A remedy is not adequate if it “falls
short of what the party is entitled to.”81 And a remedy that does not “attain
the full end and justice of the case” is not complete.82 The legal remedy
must reach the whole mischief, and secure the whole right of the party in a
perfect manner, at the present time, and in [the] future; otherwise, equity will
interfere and give such relief and aid as the exigency of the particular case
may require.83

Intervention was premised on the notion that justice incorporated the moral
sense of the community, existing as a function not only of a community’s
technical rules, but also of “magisterial good sense, unhampered by rule.”84
It was not a usurpation on the part of Chancery for the purpose of acquiring
and exercising power; rather it was an interposition to correct gross injustice
and to address circumstances which the static and rigid common law could
not.85 There was a strong tendency to sacrifice the particular to the general,
the earliest writers of the common law, such as Bracton, Glanville, Britton and Fleta make no reference to an
equitable jurisdiction of a court of chancery. See also 10 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY A.D.
1364 TO 1471(William Paley Baildon ed., London, Bernard Quaritch 1896); id. at xix (“It seems clear that the
Chancellor had and exercised judicial functions of his own as early as the reign of Richard II if not Edward III.”).
See generally JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1828).
77
Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 312 (1933).
78
Helmut Coing, English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law, 71 LAW QTRLY. REV.
223 (April 1955).
79
ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 24
(1952); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA § 33 AT 22-26 (12th ed. 1877); GEORGE COOPER, A TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 128-29 (1813); MITFORD, EQUITY PLEADING 112, 123 (Jeremy, ed. ___); 1
WOODES., LECTURES vii, 214, 215; ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 17
(1895); Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 854 (1918);
Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 84 (1934).
80
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 at 22-26 (12th ed. 1877) (citing
Rathbone v. Warren, 10 Johns. 587; King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384; Southampton Dock Co. v. Southampton H.
& P. Board, L. R. 11 Eq. 254).
81
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 at 22-26 (12th ed. 1877).
82
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 at 22-26 (12th ed. 1877) (“Where the
remedy at law is adequate, but is involved in delay and is in several respects inconvenient and circuitous, the
cause will entertain jurisdiction in equity.”)
83
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 33 at 22-26 (12th ed. 1877).
84
Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 701-02 (1913).
85
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21,
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justice to certainty.”86 The function of Equity was the correction of the law
where it was deficient by reason of its universality.87 The regimes of Law
and Equity thus approached a given set of facts from opposite angles—
invoking distinctive traditions, applying different reasoning, and pursuing
separate aims.88
This exercise of defining Equity invites an immediate comparison to
ADR. As with Equity,89 ADR is routinely noted as difficult to define.90
Both systems tend to be defined by the heterogeneous medley of subjects
that they resolve rather than a priori reasoning:
ADR has never had a unified theory to explain what it accomplishes and how
it works. … It is easier to point to discrete practices than to discern the entire
direction of the new movement. ADR has no generally accepted abstract or
theoretical definition.91

Yet with both, elaborate systems of illustrations and generalizations, even if
“loose and liberal, large and vague,”92 suggests some discernible
jurisprudence.93
22 (1919-1920).
86
Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 310 (1933).
87
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, V, xiv; CICERO, DE ORATORE, I, § 57; JUSTINIAN, PANDECT, 50.17.85; BRACTON, DE
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, I, iv, § 5 (1569); GROTIUS, DE AEQUITATE, c. 1, § 2 (1689) (“Haec
Aequitas suggerit, etsi jure deficiamur.”); 5 PUFFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE, c. 12, § 21 (Oldfather’s transl. 1934);
1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 3 (14th ed. 1918).
88
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 444
(2003).
89
See, e.g., William Q. deFuniak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54 (1948-1949) (“All
writers on the subject of equity seem to start their discussions in agreement that the term is difficult to define.”);
CHARLES E. HOGG, EQUITY PRINCIPLES 3 (1900) (“[T]o attempt to define the powers and jurisdiction of a court of
equity would only result in embarrassment and confusion….”); Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity
Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (1951) (“The legal term ‘equity’ is generally acknowledged to be
impossible to define completely.”); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers,
31 VA. L. REV. 753, 756 (1945) (“There is no definition of equity that will satisfy.”).
90
See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation CoOpted or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1. 1 n.2 (1991) (“Terminology and categorization are very
problematic in this field.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument that the term
“ADR” Has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97, 102 (2000) (noting that the modes of ADR
range from “pin stripes” to “Birkenstocks). See also n.__ supra and accompanying text. And, of course, problems
with terminology can, in turn, create doctrinal and analytical challenges. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding
Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument that the term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness, 2000 J.
DISP. RESOL. 97, 110 (2000) (“We should be more self-conscious of grouping together techniques that may often
merit separate analysis.”).
91
Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 425-26 (1986). Compare FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF
ACTION 19 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (“I do not think that any one has expounded or ever will expound equity as a
single, consistent system, an articulate body of law. It is a collection of appendixes between which there is no very
close connection.”); Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 315 (1938) (referring to Equity as a
set of “empirical remedies”—disconnected appendices or glosses to the common law in particular areas);
Alexander Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New Federal Procedure, 31 CAL. L.
REV. 127, 130 (1942-1943) (referring to the separate systems of law and equity as “accidents of history”).
92
William Searle Holdsworth, The Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REV. 293, 295 (1915) (discussing
the jurisprudence of equity) (quotation omitted).
93
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or
“The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1. 2 (1991) (discussing the development of a “‘jurisprudence’ of
ADR”); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 222 (1995) (discussing the evolution and history of a “law of ADR”).
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The systemic comparison runs still deeper. Both Equity and ADR preexisted their respective formal counterparts.94 And both matured
incrementally and in reaction to those formal systems.95 Courts of Equity
exercised jurisdiction if, but only if, the law courts failed to provide plain,
adequate and complete relief.96 Every order or rule administered in Equity
was born of some emergency, to meet some new condition that was not
otherwise remediable in the Common Law courts.97 Catching the overflow
of the litigation crisis in waves of procedural reforms,98 ADR may be no
less an accident of history: ADR may not be “so much as a good, in and of
itself, but rather as a good because the system is in ‘crisis’ and something is
needed to fix it.” 99
In crude summary, then, both ADR and Equity are systems that channel
a jurisprudence larger than themselves with a jurisdiction defined in large
part by the inability of their respective formal counterparts to adjudicate a
particular matter plainly, adequately, and completely.
B. Identifying Motives
A fundamental difference between the jurisdiction of Equity and the
jurisdiction of ADR is who makes the determination about whether the
94
See nn. __ and accompanying text, infra and supra. See also Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors?
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 213 (1995) (discussing
“What came first?”). ). The roots of equity run as deep as history can dig. See generally History of the
Peloponnesian War, in 3 THUCYDIDES 37–40 (Richard Crawley trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); The Laws,
in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 757d–e, 736d–e, 875c (Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); The
Statesman, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 294a (Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); GEORGE
SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 326 (1846) (associating the royal
prerogative with sovereignty itself).
95
See nn. __ and accompanying text, infra and supra.
96
EDMUND H. T. SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 2 (18th ed. 1920). See also Sherman Steele, The Origin
and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 10, 13 (1926) (“The process of delimiting the
jurisdiction of chancery was largely one of self-determination.”); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
th
OF ENGLISH LAW 453 (5 ed. 1931) (“To write fully of the equitable jurisdiction of the Chancellor would be to
write the history of equity itself”).
97
See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 48 at 49 (2d ed. 1892)
(“[E]very equitable rule which it announced, was of necessity an innovation to a greater or less extent upon the
then existing common law”); Alexander Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New
Federal Procedure, 31 CAL. L. REV. 127, 130 (1943) (history of equity).
98
For a discussion of ADR in the context of other procedural reforms, see Judith Resnik, Many Doors?
Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 222-241
(1995); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 309-23 (1996).
99
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 244-45 (1995). See also Judith Resnik, Civil Litigation in the Twenty-First Century:
A Panel Discussion, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1199, 1207 (1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an
Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991);
Susan Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to
the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 450-51 (1989); Harry Edwards,
Commentary: Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 672-74 (1986).
Compare FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 3 (__) (suggesting that by
the end of the thirteenth century the number of petitions had become very large and the work of reading them was
onerous).
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remedy provided by the formal system is plain, adequate and complete to
the satisfaction of the litigant. In Equity, the Chancellor made that
decision.100 Participation in ADR, however, if often at the discretion of the
parties.101 To compare the systems of ADR and Equity, then, one must
explore the motives that generate interest in ADR.
In the sections that follow, I examine the keystones of the system of
ADR, and explore their medieval equitable analogues. A quote from the
ADR casebook authored by Professors Riskin and Westbrook provides the
organizational structure for this discussion. Those thoughtful commentators
write:
Five motives, often intermingled, fire most of the current interest in
alternatives to traditional litigation: 1. Saving time and money, and possibly
rescuing the judicial system from an overload; 2. Having “better” processes—
more open, flexible and responsive to the unique needs of the participants. …
3. Achieving “better” results—outcomes that serve the real needs of the
participants or society; 4. Enhancing community involvement in the dispute
resolution process; and 5. Broadening access to “justice”.102

As explored in the sections that follow, each of these motives echoes a
theme that is characteristic of Equity.
1. Saving Time and Money
Rhetoric about the rampant costs and inefficiencies of formal
adjudication occupies a central role in the ADR canon.103
The common perception is that judges and lawyers, the procedural rigor of
justice and substantive incantations of legality, lay juries and technical experts
hurt more than they help. The recourse to legal actors and proceedings is
100

See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
Of course not all ADR is voluntary. See ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET,
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 545-596 (3rd ed. 2002); Edward F. Sherman,
Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation Should be Required?, 46 SMU L.
REV. 2079 (1993).
102
LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 2 (2d ed. 1997).
Another leading ADR casebook offers the following list of “justifications” for ADR: (i) “To lower court
caseloads and expenses”; (ii) “To reduce the parties’ expenses and time”; (iii) “To provide speedy settlement of
those disputes that were disruptive of the community or the lives of the parties’ families”; (iv) “To improve public
satisfaction with the justice system”; (v) “To encourage resolutions that were suited to the parties’ needs”; (vi)
“To increase voluntary compliance with resolutions”; (vii) “To restore the influence of neighborhood and
community values and the cohesiveness of communities”; (viii) “To provide accessible forums to people with
disputes”; and (ix) “To teach the public to try more effective processes than violence or litigation for settling
disputes.” STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS, SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003). Although I opted for the
Riskin & Westbrook framework for organizational purposes (finding less overlap in the enumerated factors), I
also refer occasionally to the Goldberg et al. factors.
103
LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998) (a principal motive fueling ADR is “saving time and money, and possibly rescuing the
judicial system from an overload”). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS
& SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed.
2003) (“To lower court caseloads and expenses; To reduce the parties’ expenses and time, To provide speedy
settlement of those disputes that were disruptive of the community or the lives of the parties’ families”).
101
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costly, emotionally debilitating, and potentially counterproductive.104
[T]he adversary system … can be a hugely inefficient means of uncovering
facts; its relentless formalities and ceaseless opportunities for splitting hairs
are time consuming and expensive.105

Naturally, these criticisms are often infused with crisis rhetoric about the
litigation explosion and overburdened courts.106 By providing “a less
legalistic process than litigation”107 the effective use of ADR is thought to
compare favorably with the acrimony, costs, and time of ordinary
litigation.108
Equity, too, was “simple, inexpensive and speedy in its origins.”109
Litigants came to Equity to avoid the gratuitous rigor, relentless formalities,
and tedious hair-splitting that epitomized formal adjudication in the
common law courts.110 In Equity there were no technical rules of pleading
or procedure.111 Indeed, animated by the juristic principles of discretion,
natural justice, fairness and good conscience, the essence of a jurisprudence
of equity is somewhat inconsistent with the establishment of formal rules.112
104
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1 (1989).
105
JETHRO LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 171 (1983).
106
See nn. __ and accompanying text, supra.
Alvin B. Rubin et al., Colloquy on Complex Litigation, 1981 BYU L. REV. 741, 747 (“[I]f more is not done
to reduce the expense of litigation, the legal profession will be destroyed.”); Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United
States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465 (1984) (growing workload demands
on courts “best relieved by diverting cases” to ADR techniques); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the
Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 253 (1985); Chief Justice Urges Greater Use of Arbitration to Relieve Courts of Litigation
Burdens, 17 THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 1 (Oct. 1985); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (discussing “litigation explosion”).
107
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 721(1999). See also Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorney’s Fees: The Role of ADR, 46
SMU L. REV. 2005, 2028 (1993) (there is “much less ‘lawyering’ in arbitration than in litigation”).
108
Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving Perspective to Informed
Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909, 909 n.2 (2002). See also Maureen A. Weston, Checks on
Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation,
Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 592 (2001) (calling the ADR movement an “effort to avoid the
delay, expense, technicality, and acrimony of traditional judicial litigation”). For a discussion of contemporary
empirical data about time and cost savings, see nn. __ infra and accompanying text. In this Part II.B., however,
ADR is contemplated in its pure, original form.
109
Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. REV. 109, 112 (1934). A
discussion of the ossification of equity procedure is reserved for Part III, infra.
110
See nn. __ infra and accompanying text.
111
. See Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 88
(1934) (“No form was necessary and no strict procedure had to be followed.”); William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to
the Chancellor’s Court, 17 GEO. L.J. 97, 106 (1928-1929) (“Relief was given without a writ. The bill [in equity]
was generally in simply form, without formality, and free from the technical rules which applied to writs.”);
Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 854 (1918) (“Less
exactness of pleading was required than by the law, and even if a bill were ‘misconceived’ the complaint was not
out of court.”).
112
See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 20 (1905). See generally Colin P.
Campbell, The Court of Equity—A Theory of its Jurisdiction, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 110 (1903) (noting the intimacy
of the relations among the basic principles of “natural justice, equity, honest, generosity and good conscience”).
See generally FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 12-22 (Chaytor ed. 1909);
JOHN SALMOND, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1893) (suggesting there is no body of rules for
equity)_; JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 64 (1913)
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Equity’s mandate to do justice demanded that it be administered swiftly and
inexpensively.113 Litigants did not need the representation of a pleader.114
Nor were litigants required to pay a filing fee.115
The comparative advantage in “time and money” that both ADR and
Equity purported to offer as alternative systems was largely a function of
their “better processes” and “better results.” That discussion follows
immediately in subparts 2 and 3, infra.
2. Procedural Flexibility
Interest in ADR is also generated by the desire for processes that can be
tailored to the unique needs of a particular case.116 Proponents of ADR
argue that control or autonomy over issues of process may lead to a more
effective and satisfying resolution of the dispute.117 The ADR narrative
emphasizes that rigid procedural rules can be manipulated, misused, and
abused by “‘gladiators’ fixated on purely adversarial solutions.”118 The
relative informality of ADR means that pre-trial procedures, elaborate
pleading, motion practice, and discovery can be modified, streamlined, or in
many cases completely eliminated to reach the merits of the dispute.119 Of
course formal adjudication is thought to have experienced a similar
conversion in favor of a flexible and subservient procedural schemata.120
Yet ADR remains a popular alternative to many because of its “‘better’
processes—more open, flexible and responsive to the unique needs of the

(describing equity as a court “of indefinite powers and unrestricted procedure”).
113
JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103-04 (4th ed. 2002)
114
Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760
n.17 (1945).
115
Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760
n.17 (1945).
116
LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH
RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003) (“To
improve public satisfaction with the justice system; … to increase voluntary compliance with resolutions”)
117
Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving Perspective to Informed
Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909, ___ (2002) (commenting that autonomy is a key value in
ADR).
118
Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Legal Problem Solving, 11
CLINICAL L: REV. 149, 159 (2004) (citations omitted).
Of course whether disputants favor adversarialism is highly disputed. See, e.g., Laurens Walker, E. Allan
Lind & John Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1420
(1979).
119
Alan S. Rau, Resolving Disputes Over Attorney’s Fees: The Role of ADR, 46 SMU L. REV. 2005, 202728 (1993). See also Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1,
31 (1987) (viewing ADR as procedural reform). See also Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 31, 33 (1987) (“While various ADR procedures permit some exchange of
information between disputants, the process is informal, ambiguous, and not administered in a managerial
fashion…. The spirit of ADR is antidiscovery.”).
120
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
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participants.”121 ADR offers relief from the “formal, tricky, divisive, timeconsuming, and distorting” subterfuge that plagues formal adjudication.122
The Law courts were notorious for their idolatry of form and forms.123
Complex, unforgiving and formulaic rules of pleading, procedure, and proof
could be navigated successfully only by the “form-mad common
lawyers.”124 Failure to purchase the correct writ or to comply with minor
technical requirements were incurable mistakes.125 The rigors of single
issue pleading, too, tolerated not even the slightest misjudgment.126 The
entire fate of a lawsuit could turn upon the exact words that the parties
uttered when they appeared before the tribunal: “The client was unthought
of…. The right was nothing, the mode of stating, everything.”127
If a wrong action was adopted, the error was fatal to the whole proceeding,
however clearly the facts of the controversy might have been brought before
the proper court…. It was not enough that he stood within the temple of
justice, he must have entered through a particular door.128

This pathways-to-justice metaphor (although evocative of Sander’s “multidoor courthouse”129) may be deceptively pacific. Other commentators used
121
LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998).
122
Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 427 (1986). See also nn. __ and accompanying text, supra.
123
William Q. de Funiak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 TUL. L. REV. 54, 57 (1948-1949) (“A growing
worship of formalism and technicality also began to obsess the courts of law.”); George Palmer Garrett, The Heel
of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 32, 35 (1924-25) (“[T]he Common Law has brought about its own downfall by its
idolatry of the forms it created.”).
124
George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 30, 31 (discussing “form-mad common
lawyers”). See also George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM L. REV. 87, 96 (1916)
(explaining the law court’s “hard and fast system”); JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN
ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 61-62 (1913) (referring to the common law’s “formulaic procedure”); 1
WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW ___ (__ ed. ___) (discussing the “complicated
machinery” of the law courts).
125
JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING 39 (1969) (“When the plaintiff
petitioned the Chancellor for an Original Writ, he was under great pressure to select the right Writ for the facts of
his case…. If he selected a Form of Writ which did not fit his case … he could not succeed.”).
126
The common law pleadings rules earned the dubious distinction as “the most exact, if not the most occult,
of the sciences.” 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WM. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 612. There are
three fundamental rules to single-issue pleading. First, after a declaration, the parties must at each stage (i) demur;
(ii) plead by way of traverse; or (iii) plead by way of confession and avoidance. Second, upon a traverse, issue
must be tendered. And third, the issue, when well tendered, must be accepted. Either by virtue of the first rule, a
demurrer takes place which is a tneder of an issue in law, or, by the joint operation of the first two rules, the tender
of an issue in fact. And then, by virtue of the second and third rules, the issue so tendered, whether in fact or in
law, is accepted and becomes finally complete. It is by these rules that th eproduction of an issue is effected. See
generally HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 136 (2d ed. 1901). Encyclopedic
volumes of supplemental rules and principles ensure the production of an issue that is truly but one issue, see, e.g.,
id. §§ 137-69, 164-339, that is material, see, e.g., id. §§ 170-74, 340-45, and is unified, see, e.g., §§ 175-90, 34671, and is certain, see, e.g, id. §§ 191-228, 372-430, and is neither obscure nor confusing, see, e.g., §§ 229-243,
431-52, and will lead to neither prolixity nor delay in pleading, see, e.g., §§ 244-49, 453-65. See also id. §§ 25059, 466-81 (“Certain Miscellaneous Rules”); R. ROSS PERRY, COMMON-LAW PLEADING 231-81 (1897)
(discussing the rules and mechanics of issue pleading).
127
Coleridge, The Law in 1847 and the Law in 1889, THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW 797, 800 (1890). See
also FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WM. MAITLAND, 1 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 559 (__ ed. 19__).
128
CHARLES HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 46
(1987).
129
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
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war metaphors to express the stakes and the intricate terms of
engagement.130 By all accounts, the process was a contest of skill; and
success depended upon observing the formal rules of the combat.131
The contemporary discourse of ADR uses the same rhetoric and
metaphors in its derisive characterizations of formal adjudication.132 In fact,
the Roscoe Pound speech that served as the rallying cry for Chief Justice
Burger’s Pound Conference in 1976 (the birth of the modern ADR
movement133) was itself a plea for equity. Roscoe Pound referred to the
“sporting theory of justice” when criticizing the rigidity of common law
pleading.134 Arguing in 1906 for a more equity-based procedure, Pound
criticized the sporting theory on the ground that it led to deciding cases
“according to the rules of the game” rather than in accordance with a
“search independently for truth and justice.”135
Although the manner by which procedure was exploited in the Law
courts and in contemporary formal adjudication differed,136 the result of the
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) (“The room directory in the lobby
of such a [Dispute Resolution] Center might looks as follows: Screening Clerk—Room 1; Mediation—Room 2;
Arbitration—Room 3 …”). See generally Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 217 (1995) (discussing Sander’s metaphor).
See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 348 (1996)
(discussing the importance of the procedural justice metaphors).
130

[The system of common law forms of action] contains every species of medieval weapon from a two handed
sword to the poniard. The man who has a quarrel with his neighbor comes hither to choose his weapon. The
choice is large; but he must remember that he will not be able to change weapons in the middle of the ocmbat
and also that every weapon has its proper use and may put to none other. If he selects a sword, he must
observe the rules of swod-play; he must not to try to use his cross-bow as a mace.

2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WM. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 559.
For a discussion of the importance of metaphors generally, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How
Images of Battle, Sports, and Sex Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225 (1995).
131
CHARLES HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND
47-48 (1897) (The issue of the combat must not be determined by mere brute force—not even by the brute force
of indisputable facts arrayed before the Court.”)
132
See, e.g., Douglas Yarn, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism Through
Institutionalization, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 957 (2004) (referring to adjudication and ADR as “war and
diplomacy,” respectively) (citation omitted); Robert F. Blomquist, Some (Mostly) Theoretical and (Very Brief)
Pragmatic Observations on Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution in America, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 343,
__ (2000) (discussing the relative efficiency and efficacy of ADR in contrast to “courtroom battles”); Kenneth R.
Feinberg, Resolving Mass Tort Claims: The Perspective of a Special Master, 53- WTR DISP. RESOL. J. 10, __
(1998) (contrasting ADR with the typical “protracted litigation war of attrition”); Thomas R. McCoy, The
Sophisticated Consumer’s Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques: What You Should Expect (or
Demand) From ADR Services, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 975, __ (1996) (“Mediation is not a spectator sport for the
parties like litigation where lawyer-champions do battle on behalf of their parties…”); Richard A. Williamson,
The Use of Experts Under the Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in Alternative Dispute Resolution
Forums, PLI Order No. H4-5185 Mar.-Apr. 1994 at 414 (“Whereas litigation is war, Arbitration is a Skirmish,
and Mediation, Early Neutral Evaluation and similar informal non-binding ADR process can be likened to
Powwows that may lead to a lasting and satisfactory peace.”).
133
See nn. __ supra.
134
Roscoe Pound, The Canons of Procedural Reform, 12 A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1926).
135
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV.
729, 738 (1906).
See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
136
In the Law courts it was the technicality of the rules that created the problem. In contemporary
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exploitation was the same (and with lawyers to blame).137 Like ADR
centuries later, Equity sought to relocate dispute resolution away from an
emphasis on procedure, and toward a consideration of the underlying
merits.
The Common Law made a fetich of procedure. Obviously, this was to put the
cart before the horse. In any satisfactory system of law, procedure must
always remain a means, not an end. It must always be subordinate to the
purpose of the process, which is to right wrong. Glanville, and Bracton, and
Littleton, and Coke forgot this. They became so interested in forms that they
allowed the substance to escape.138

With neither forms of action nor technical pleading rules Equity focused
instead on the merits of the dispute.139 Although “form” is not itself a
pejorative,140 one could fairly conclude that “law deal[t] with form, equity
adjudication, it is (allegedly) their generality that is exploited. Add cites discussing the writs and forms of action.
Add cites discussing the dimensions of transsubstantive and non-transsubstantive procedure.
137
Compare Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the
Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 938-945 (discussing “scorched earth litigation” and “Rambo
tactics” by litigators in a search of a competitive advantage in high stakes litigation); William M. Howard,
Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L.
REV. 255, 289 (1994) (suggesting that many formal court actions are extended unnecessarily by lawyers who
exploit or abuse judicial procedures, especially liberal rules for pretrial discovery); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237,
2240 (1989) (“Discovery of documents in cases involving the conduct of business or government often proceeds
by a vicious game in which the respondent has every incentive to trim and cheat. Highly developed dialectical
skills have evolved.”) with nn. ___, supra.
138
George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 30, 31 (1924-1925). Compare Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988) (Lawyers “are expected and even
encouraged to exploit every loophole in the rules, take advantage of every one of their opponents’ tactical
mistakes or oversights, and stretch every legal or factual interpretation to favor their clients. The guiding premise
of the entire system is that maintaining the integrity of rights-guarding procedures is more important than …
enforcing the substantive law against its violators.”).
139
Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 40 (1951)
(“[T]he plaintiff set forth his cause in a ‘bill.’ Then the chancellor would issue a ‘subpoena,’ in the king’s name,
to summon the opposing party, who could demur, enter a plea, or file an ‘answer.”).
No form was necessary and no strict procedure had to be followed. The difference from proceedings on writs
is significant. It may be said that all that was necessary was to state sufficient facts to show a reason for
granting relief. Indeed it appears that if a bill did not state sufficient facts, permission was granted by the
Justice to amend viva voce, a procedure which would not have been tolerated at Westminster.

Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934).
In the equity procedure one encounters no bewildering rules as to the name or classification of the particular
suit, or according to the nomenclature at law, “forms of action.” When from an investigation of the law and
facts, counsel has determined that the client has a good cause for equitable relief, he is saved the problem of
wasting brain-sweat in deciding whether he shall sue in debt, assumpsit, or covenant, in trover or replevin, in
trespass vi et armis or trespass on the case He simply decides to file a “bill in equity.”

EDWIN B. MEADE, LILE’S EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 95 at 59 (3rd ed. 1952). See generally Thomas O.
Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 457-58 (2003).
140

The science of special pleading is an excellent logic; it is admirably calculated for the purposes of analyzing a
cause, of extracting, like the roots of an equation, the true points in dispute, and referring them with all
imaginable distinctness to the court or jury. It is reducible to the strictest rules of pure dialectics, and tends to
fix the attention, give a habit of reasoning clearly, quicken the apprehension and invigorate the understanding.

Sir William Jones’ Works. Prefatory Discourse to the Speeches of Isæus, IV. 34. (f.) IX. 50, 51 (8 vo.). See also
Robinson v. Rayley, 1 Burr., at p. 319 (Mansfield, J.) (“the substantial rules of pleading are founded in strong
sense and the soundest and closest logic.”); HALE, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON LAW 212 (comparing
pleading rules to the roots of an equation).
One of the best qualities of our medieval law was that in theory it left little or nothing at all events within the
sphere of procedure, to the discretion of the justices. They themselves desired that this should be so and took
care that it was or seemed to be so. They would be responsible for nothing beyond an application of iron
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with substance.”141 Chancery “had the power to look beyond the form to the
substance and may lend his power in aid of a person wronged to see that the
wrong does not go without a remedy.”142
Blaming the legal education and training for much of the distortion,
both Equity and ADR promise an alternative that elevates the merits of the
disputes over the forms and modes of its adjudication.143 ADR and Equity
thus can both be cast as an escape from systems where the formalized
means for protecting rights themselves become the barriers to the effective
redress of grievances.144
Lawyers may be drawn to ADR for reasons other than savings of cost or
time.145 Privacy is one component of the procedural flexibility that makes
ADR attractive to some.146 Unlike formal adjudication, pleadings (if any)
need not publicly filed; hearings are neither known nor available to the
public; there may exist no transcript; and even the decision need not be

rules.

FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WM. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 561 (___). See also id.
(“Had they aimed at a different end, they would have “received” the plausibly reasonable system of procedure
which the civilians and canonists were constructing, and then the whole stream of our legal history would have
been turned into a new channel. For good and ill they made their choice.”)
141
Edward Robeson Taylor, The Fusion of Law and Equity, __ U. PA. L. REV. 17 (___).
142
Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 90
(1934).
143
For a discussion of how form was the focus of both the practice and the study of the Law, see THEODORE
F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 380-81 (5th ed. 1956) (discussing efforts of
Glanville, Bracton and Littleton.); JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY ___ [4952??](4th ed. 2002); S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 59 (2d ed. 1981)
(explaining that procedure dicatated how the law existed and how lawyers thought); JOSEPH H. KOFFLER &
ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADING (1969) (“the Law was required to express itself through the Limited
System of Writs and Forms of Action sanctioned by precedent”). HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON
EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883) (noting that common lawyers could see the law “only through the envelope
of its technical forms.”).
Compare Laura Nader & Linda R. Singer, Dispute Resolution: What are the Choices?, CALIF. ST. BAR J.
281, 314-15 (July 1976):
Law schools rarely teach the essential skills of negotiation and mediation; rather their concentration on the
dissection of appellate court cases emphasizes the escalation of disputes rather than their prevention or early
settlement. Heavy dependence on the case method, with its focus on individual problems, makes unlikely any
systematic approach to resolving mass problems. The dearth of interdisciplinary study makes it difficult for
lawyers to perceive alternative ways of dealing with different types of existing disputes and those likely to
arise from emerging technologies.
144
Compare THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1 (1989) (__) with Coleridge, The Law in 1847 and the Law in 1889, __ THE
CONTEMPORARY REVIEW 797, 798 (June 1890) (“[T]ruth was quite unable to force its way through the barriers
erected against its opposite.”). See also FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 1222 (Chaytor ed. 1909); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 1-5 (13th ed. 1906) (suggesting that the true and original
distinction between law and equity is one, not between two conflicting bodies of rules, but between a system of
judicial administration based on fixed rules and a competing system governed solely by judicial discretion);
JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 64 (1913) (referring to
equity as a court “of indefinite powers and unrestricted procedure”).
145
Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58- APR DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 39 (Feb.Apr. 2003) (highlighting the values of selecting a decision maker, secrecy and flexibility in scheduling).
146
See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 47, 54 (1996); Edward J. Costello, Jr., ADR: Virtue or Vice?, 54- May DISP. RESOL. J. 62 (1999); Robert F.
Blomquist, Is Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution Working in America?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10661,
10666 (2000).
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released to anyone other than the interested parties.147 The informality and
flexibility of Equity made those proceedings similarly “private,” at least in
certain respects. For example, in early Equity many proceedings were
initiated not by a recorded bill, but by word of mouth.148 And because there
was no notion of precedent in early Equity, the reporting of Chancery
proceeding was sporadic and largely unnecessary.149 Moreover, similar to
the ADR forum-of-choice, a private conference room or hotel suite,150
Chancery “could sit anywhere, even in the chancellor’s private house.”151
Of course ADR and Equity suffered criticism for this informality and
secrecy.152
Part of the allure of ADR may be that system’s ability to alter the
procedure to identify a procedurally neutral site. Formal adjudication tends
to locate the suit in the “home” court of one party or the other. Because both
sides have the same home court instinct, the only neutral forum on which
they can agree is ADR.153 This is especially an issue in international

147
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 721-23(1999).
148
See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103 (4th ed. 2002).
149
See Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 763
(1945) (“there were no regular reports of the cases that were decided”); 73 SELDEN SOCIETY, NOTTINGHAM’S
CHANCERY CASES VOL. 1, Introduction, xlii & n.3 (D.E.C. Yale, ed.1957); Vidal v. Girard’s Exrs., 2 How. 127,
193 (1844) (Story, J.) (equity decisions had no precedential effect because the rulings were contained in reports
that were “shadowy, obscure and flickering”).

Bacon’s desire to systematize the practice of the Court of Chancery is also illustrated by his plea for equity
law reports, contained in his “Proposition touching the Compiling and Amendment of the Laws of England’
addressed to james I during his attorney-generalship. In it he pays a rare tribute to Coke, when he observes
that but for the reports of the great chief justice ‘the law by this time had been almost like a ship without
ballast,’ and he urges the sovereign to appoint ‘grave and sound lawyers’ to be paid reporters in the courts.
This suggestion bore fruit in 1617, for on October 20th (only a few months after Bacon had assumed office),
the “Ordinance for the Constitution of the Reporters of the Law’ was issued, two reporters, with a salary of
£100 a year each being appointed. The size of the salary, unusual in those days, may be taken as an indication
of the importance that Bacon attached to law reporting.

George W. Keeton, Bacon as a Chancery Judge, 17 IOWA L. REV. 476, 477-78 (1932-1933).
150
STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 7 (2002). Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S.
Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, LITIG. Winter 1985, 30, 31 (“Often the room is a hotel suite sporting
masonite folding tables positioned in an inverted “U.” There is no gavel or bailiff, no robed figure sitting above
the proceeding. Rather, there are one to three businessmen, seated comfortably at the top of the “U,” chatting
informally with the parties.”). See also Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 248-49 (1995) (discussing the ADR
empowerment thesis in the context of the informality of those proceedings).
151
See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103 (4th ed. 2002).
152
See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 28
(1987) (“the absence of records and of written opinions make the pathology of ADR difficult.”). In Equity the
criticism was part of an attack on the overall arbitrariness of the system. See, e.g., JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE
TALK 64 (The Legal Classics Library 1989) (“Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure … equity is
according to the conscience of himthat is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. Tis all one as
if they should make the standard for the measure a Chancellor’s foot.”); 6 BULSTRODE WHITELOCK, COMMONS
JOURNALS 373 (1650) (“The proceedings in Chancery are secundum arbitrium boni viri, and this arbitrium
differeth as much in several men as their countenances differ. That which is right in one man’s eyes is wrong in
another’s.”); Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 82
(1934) (Mocking the jurisprudence of equity as “some sort of Philosopher’s Stone by which injustice is whisked
into justice by the simple method of preparing a form of petition lately called a ‘bill’.”).
153
See Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause—Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26 AM. BUS. L.J.
575, 581 (1988).
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disputes.154 Here the analogy from Equity is rather loose. Although we
know that Equity courts “could sit anywhere”155 we have no reason to
believe that the Chancellor opted for a neutral site.
An expert decision-maker is another component of the procedural
flexibility that makes ADR attractive. In certain complex cases, litigants
may wish to avoid a jury or judge in favor of a neutral with technical
expertise.156 Equity procedure may be considered analogous here only in
that there were no juries.157 Of course to the extent that the jurisprudence of
Equity was but the jurisprudence of conscience,158 the chancellor, often a
trained ecclesiastic, was undoubtedly an “expert.”159
And lastly, finality and the avoidance of an expensive and timeconsuming appellate process is another claimed advantage of the flexibility
of ADR.160 As a result of the Federal Arbitration Act, and equivalent state
statutes and international treaties, arbitration awards are final and can be as
easy (or even easier) to enforce as decisions from judges and juries.161
Again there is an equitable analogue: relief was enforced at once, and we
understand that there were no appeals from Chancery until the seventeenth
century.162
154
See nn. __, supra. See also Andrew Sagartz, Note, Resolution of International Commercial Disputes:
Surmounting Barriers of Culture Without Going to Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675 (1998).
155
See JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 103 (4th ed. 2002).
156
Deborah R. Hensler, Science in the Court: Is there a Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 SUM
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 189 (1991) (suggesting that the use expert adjudication may be the “main appeal
of private arbitration”).
157

[Common law courts] proceed to the trial of contested facts by means of a jury; and the evidence is generally
to be drawn, not from the parties, but from third persons, who are disinterested witnesses. But courts of equity
try causes without a jury; and they address themselves to the conscience of the defendant, and require him to
answer upon his oath the matters of fact stated in the bill, if they are within his knowledge; and he is
compellable to give a full account of all such facts, with all their circumstances, without evasion, or
equivocation; and the testimony of other witnesses also may be taken to confirm, or to refute, the facts so
alleged. Indeed, every bill in equity may be said to be, in some sense, a bill of discovery, since it asks for the
personal oath of the defendant, to purge himself in regard to the transactions stated in the bill. It may readily
be perceived, how very important this process of discovery may be, when we consider how great the mass of
human transactions is, in which there are no other witnesses, or persons, having knowledge thereof, except the
parties themselves.

1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 31 at 21 (12th ed. 1877).
158
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
159
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
160
Kevin R. Case, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 5 (1993); Stephen J.
Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 72223 (1999).
161
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 722-23 (1999).
162
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 935-36 (1997) (“in
1675, the House of Lords accepted jurisdiction over ‘appeals in equity’ from Chancery.”). See also JULIUS
GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 26
(The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1971) (suggesting that
the colonial appeal could not “have been in imitation of the English Chancery appeal, for this was still, so to
speak, in vetre sa mere when the the first American enactments were put on the books.”). See generally Benjamin
Goldman, The Scope of Review and Requests for Rulings in Equity Suits, 23 B.U. L. REV. 66 (1943). Cf. Mary
Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 927 (1997) (explaining a horizontal
system of mutual review by peer courts).
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3. Substantive Flexibility
Although the substantive law undoubtedly casts its “shadow” on ADR
processes,163 we may be skeptical of the significance of shadows.164 In the
more voluntary and less structured forms of ADR, such as mediation, where
the ultimate authority belongs to the participants themselves, the parties
(perhaps with the benefit of a third party facilitator) can fashion a unique
solution that will work for them without being strictly governed by
precedent.165 Rigid adherence to legal formulae can frame debates in a zerosum model that obscures parties’ goals and overlooks a richer set of
possible resolutions.166
A formalist, rule-bound institution is ill equipped to recognize what is really at
stake in its conflicts with the environment. It is likely to adopt
opportunistically because it lacks criteria for rational reconstruction of
outmoded or inappropriate policies…. The idea of legality needs to be
conceived more generally and to be cured of formalism.167

ADR is attractive to some, then, because of the system’s promise of “better”
results that serve “the real needs of the participants or society.”168 These
163
See Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
164
This is a reference to Plato’s famous allegory about the prisoners in the cave. PLATO, REPUBLIC, 514A521C.
165
J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT
LITIGATION 10 (1984)
166
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 252 (internal footnotes omitted). HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION 33-35 91982); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 15 (1987) (citing MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 25:01 (1984); JAY
FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT
LITIGATION 10 (1984); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 425, 529 (1986); Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 552). Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 182
(2003). Of course suggesting that there is, in fact, a “right” answer presumes the superiority of the adversary ideal.
See, e.g., FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note __, at 56-80 (encouraging exploitation of differences in time
horizons or risk preferences).

The dynamic of arbitrator self-interest has long been familiar in collective bargaining cases and is thought, for
example, to provide one explanation for the apparently common practice of compromise awards. Repeat
business for the arbitrator is likely only if he is able to retain the future goodwill of both union and
management; the desire to do so may give him an incentive (in the hallowed phrase) to ‘split the baby’ in a
single arbitration, or it may be ‘reflected in a course of decisions by the same arbitrator which over time,
taken together, appears to show a rough balance between awards favorable to labor and those favorable to
management.

Alan Scott Rau, Integrity to Private Judging, 38 SO. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523 (1997) (critiquing arbitration by
analyzing the self interest of arbitrators).
167
PHILIPPE NONET AND PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE 77,
108 (1978).
168
LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH
RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003) (“To
encourage resolutions that were suited to the parties’ needs; … To restore the influence of neighborhood and
community values and the cohesiveness of communities”).
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results may or may not “follow the law,” and it arguably does not matter
because of the parties’ voluntary acquiescence.
In those forms of ADR that more closely resemble formal adjudication,
such as binding arbitration, ADR’s relationship with the substantive law
becomes much more nuanced. On the one hand, we view arbitration clauses
as “forum selection clauses.”169 And in this regard we pronounce that “[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute,” and also remind lawyers that arbitrators are
obliged to “follow the law.”170 Yet on the other hand, we also anticipate, if
not desire a certain amount of deviation.
Soia Mentschikoff’s seminal survey of arbitrators found that eighty percent of
the studied commercial arbitrators “thought that they ought to reach their
decisions within the context of the principles of substantive rules of law, but
almost ninety percent believed that they were free to ignore these rules
whenever they thought that more just decisions would be reached by so
doing.” A more recent survey of construction arbitrators found that twentyeight percent of surveyed arbitrators reported that they do not always follow
the law in formulating their awards. And among labor arbitrators, the
“orthodox” position is that arbitrators should adhere to the collective
bargaining agreement and “ignore the law.” The widespread belief among
arbitrators that they are under no duty to apply the law is consistent with
standard expectations about arbitration because “we do not … expect that an
arbitrator will decide a case the way a judge does. We do not expect that he
will necessarily “follow the law”—or indeed apply or develop any body of
general rules as a guide to his decision.” Even courts have explicitly
acknowledged that arbitrators often do not apply the law.171
169

See Lee H. Rosenthal, ADR: One Judge’s Perspective on Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 669 (2005).
170
“The Court conceives of arbitration clauses as forum-selection clauses, but not as choice-of-law clauses.
In the Court’s view, then, an arbitration clause specifies the procedural law to be used in resolving a dispute, but
not the substantive law to be used. With respect to substantive law, Mitsubishi indicates that arbitrators must
apply the same substantive law a court would apply. Similarly, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Court held that claims under the Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable because
“although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to ensure that
arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute. 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987). The Court often says that “[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.” Id. at
229.” Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 703, 717-18 (1999). See also Michael A. Scodro, Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A
Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1946 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court’s view that
arbitration does not alter substantive rights “is in keeping with the courts’ expectation that arbitrators will follow
applicable legal rulings.”).
171
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 719-20 (1999) (citing Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 851,
867 (1961); Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction Arbitrators, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 154-55 (1994); JOHN S. MURRAY, ALAN SCOTT RAU & EDWARD F. SHERMAN,
PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 514, 636 (2nd ed. 1996); IV IAN MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS
J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.5.2.4 at 40:47; Harry T. Edwards, “Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study,” in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHT ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 59 (1975); Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators
Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 683, 688 (1992); Edward Brunet, Arbitration and
Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 85 (1992) (“The weight of authority permits an arbitrator to ‘do justice
as he sees it’ and fashion an award that embodies the individual justice required by a given set of facts.”))..
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Inherent in the system of ADR is the notion that the arbiter or neutral is free
to depart from the principles of substantive law whenever they think that
more just decisions would be reached by doing so.172 Judges in the formal
courts, of course, enjoy no such leeway.173
The occasional need to depart from the strict law likewise animated the
development of the system of Equity. And a similar noble lie is repeated.
On one hand, one of the most famous maxims of Equity was Æquitas
sequitur legem, or Equity follows the Law.174 Yet on the other hand, the
172
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 721 n.83(1999) (emphasis added) (citing I GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 25.01 at 391 (rev. ed. 1995)). For a more negative characterization of arbitrators’ failure to apply
the law, see generally Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661 (1963) as cited in
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV.
703, 721-23(1999); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 252 (commenting that ADR is typically “seen as focusing on
issues, relaxing the law, and thus providing more ‘just’ results.”).
Of course even those arbitrators who try to apply the law will sometimes fail, as they may make honest
mistakes of law. In most cases in which an arbitrator does not apply the law, it will be virtually impossible for a
court to discover that the arbitrator did not apply the law. Arbitrators generally do not write reasoned opinions
explaining their decisions.” Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 721-22 (1999) (citing I MACNEIL, SPEIDEL & STIPANOWICH, supra, § 3.2.3, at
3:13; III id. § 37.4.1, at 37:10). Nor is it “common practice to make a record or transcript of the proceedings.”
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV.
703, 721-22 (1999) (citing MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note __, at 640). “Only in a few, specialized types
of arbitrations do arbitrators routinely craft written decisions—labor arbitrations, international commercial
arbitrations, and maritime arbitrations.” Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 721 n.85 (1999) (citing Edward Brunet & Charles B. Craver,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE 324 (1997).
173
See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It and
When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 605 (1990); RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 313375 (2d ed. 1996); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70 (___);
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-21 (1921); Roscoe Pound, Remarks On
Status of The Rule of Judicial Precedent, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 328-32 (1940).
174
See ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 60-64 (1895).
See also CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 97 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds.,
Selden Society 1974) (“Equity “followeth the law in all particular cases where right and Justice requireth.”);
Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., The Spirit of Equity, 16 B.U. L. REV. 345, 346 (1936) (recognizing a maxim that “equity
acts according to established rules”).
Commentators disagree about the extent to which Equity interfered with the Common Law or abated its
rigors. Sir William Blackstone, citing instances where Equity did not interfere, concludes therefrom that Equity
had no such power. His language is: “It is said that it is the business of a court of equity in England to abate the
rigor of the common law. But no such power is contended for. Hard was the case of a bond creditor whose debtor
devised away his real estate; rigorous and unjust the rule which put the devisee in a better condition than the heir;
yet a court of equity had no power to interfere. Hard is the common law still subsisting that land devised or
descending to the heir should not be liable to simple contract debts of the ancestor or devisor, although the money
was laid out in the purchase of the very land; and that the father shall never immediately succeed as heir to the real
estate of the son. But a court of equity can give no relief, though in both these instances the artificial reason of the
law, arising from feudal principles, has long since ceased.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND ___ (P. 430) (17__).
Professor Pomeroy’s caustic response to Blackstone:
“The statement in this quotation that “equity had no power to interfere,” is merely a gratuitous assumption; it
certainly had the same power to interfere which it possessed and exercised in the case of an obligor who had paid
the debt secured by his bond but had neglected to take a release. The most that can be truthful said is, that “equity
did not interfere.” Blackstone, being purely a common law, had little knowledge of equity, and his authority
concerning its principles and jurisdiction was never great…. This is one example among many of Blackstone’s
utter inability to comprehend the real spirit and workings of the English law. That equity did to a large extent
interfere with and prevent the practical operation of legal rules, and did thus furnish to suitors a corrective of the
harshness and injustice of the common law, history and the very existing system incontestably show; and that the
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very purpose of a separate system was to correct or to mitigate injustices
caused by the rigor of the Common Law.175 The root of Equity was the idea
that the law should be administered fairly, not mechanically and the rigors
of the common law were thus subject to the equitable principles of
conscience, equity, good faith, and honesty.176 Thus there are numerous
cases in which equity appears as little more than a canon for the
interpretation of the rules of Law.177 In other case Chancery might use
equity to render a verdict that compromised the Law, or “split the baby.”178
And in still other cases it would simply “correct” the Law.179
In ADR, as well, there may be significant variation from the underlying
substantive law. Having already mentioned that neutrals are inclined to
depart from the principles of substantive law to reach a more fair and just
result,180 it bears further noting that the right to vacate an arbitration
decision is very limited.181 Mere factual error, and even error of law,
chancellors, from motives of policy or otherwise, refrained from exercising their reformatory function in certain
instances, is not, in the face of the historical facts, any argument against the existence of the power.” 1 JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 54 at 55-56 (2d ed. 1892).
Justice Story wrote of the varying interpretations of this maxim: “It may mean that equity adopts and follows
the rules of law in all cases, to which those rules may, in terms, be applicable; or it may mean, that equity, in
dealing with cases of an equitable nature, adopts and follows the analogies furnished by the rules of law. Now, the
maxim is true in both of these senses, as applied to different cases and different circumstances. It is universally
true in neither sense; or rather, it is not of universal application.” 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 64 at 54 (12th ed. 1877). See also NORMAN FETTER, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §
15 at 33 (1895) (the maxim’s chief use has been stated to be the anticipation of a hasty generalization on the part
of the student that equity wantonly disregards the provisions of the common and statute law.”).
175
The Common Law reflected the primary importance of certainty in the administration of the law. Writs
and forms of action created a determinate system that reflected the influence of ancient institutions, the motives of
policy, and a felt necessity for rules that regulated those circumstances commonly present in typical human
confrontations. 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 66 at 68-70 (2d ed. 1892).
The system recognized a finite number of wrongs, and permitted no deviation from the particular modes of
procedure and proof. The Chancellor had “the right and the powers, in fact, to do as he likes, whatever hard law
and still harder practice may dictate.” Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934). Sir Henry Maine wrote that equity is “one of the agencies by which law is
brought into harmony with society.”
176
See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 385, at 524 (2d ed. 1892)
(“[I]t is undeniable that courts of equity do not recognize and protect the equitable rights of litigant parties, unless
such rights are, in pursuance of the settled juridical notions of morality, based upon conscience and good faith.”);
“Bona Fides,” Equity Imported into Common Law, 69 SOLICITOR’S J. & WKLY. RPTR. 339, 339 (Feb. 14, 1925)
(recognizing an “imaginary residuum of equitable principles, to secure redress of legal abuses”).
177
See J.L. Barton, Equity in the Medieval Common Law, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 139, __ (Ralph A. Newman, ed. 1973).
178

[T]here are many cases in which a simple judgment for either party, without qualifications or conditions, or
peculiar arrangements, will not do entire justice ex æquo et bono to either party. Some modifications of the
rights of both parties may be required; some restraints on one side, or on the other, or perhaps on both sides;
some adjustments involving reciprocal obligations, or duties; some compensatory, or preliminary, or
concurrent proceedings to fix, control, or equalize rights; some qualifications or conditions, present or future,
temporary or permanent, to be annexed to the exercise of rights, or the redress of injuries.

1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 27 at 19 (12th ed. 1877).
179
FONBLANQUE ON EQUITY (b. 1, c. 1, § 3) (“For no man can be obliged to anything contrary to the law of
nature; and indeed, no man in his senses can be presumed willing to oblige another to it”).
This rather expansive view of Equity is typical of characterizations of the system of Equity prior to the
Reformation. The expansiveness of Equity’s authority is in fact the subject of considerable debate. See nn. ___
supra and accompanying text.
180
See, nn. __, supra and accompanying text.
181
The Federal Arbitration Act provides:
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typically do not suffice to upset an award.182 Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, an arbitrator’s determination is to be enforced absent a showing of
“manifest disregard” of the law.183
Both of these alternative systems thus enjoy some flexibility in
moderating the application of the substantive law to the parties that appear
before them. Neither system, however, claims to override the law or
judgments of their respective formal counterparts. By acting in personam,
Equity could compel a person to perform a duty without directly
challenging or altering the defendant’s property rights (as determined
otherwise by the Law) and without regard to any contrary judgment
rendered in the Law courts.184
Equity does not intend to set aside what is right and just, nor does it try to pass
judgment on a ‘strict Common Law rule’ by claiming that the latter was not
well made. It merely states that, in the interest of a truly effective and fair
Administration of Justice, the ‘strict Common Law’ is not to be observed in
some particular instance.185
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in an and for the district wherein the award was made
may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final,
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made….

9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
182

The conventional wisdom is that successful challenges to arbitration awards are rare. Thirty years ago one
commentator could write that in the overwhelming majority of that miniscule portion which are appealed,
only an infinitesimal few have ever been vacated. In more recent years, the amount of “litigious wrangling”
over the enforcement of awards—and thus the number of successful challenges—has unquestionably
incrased, so as to make that something of an overstatement. Nonetheless the essential point about judicial
deference to arbitral awards still appears to be valid.

ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE
rd
OF LAWYERS 731 (3 ed. 2002). Accord IV IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 40.1.4 at 40:13 (1994) (“Over the years, the courts have taken a fairly uniform
approach to awards: Awards should be confirmed and enforced as is unless there is clear evidence of a gross
impropriety.”)
183
Wilko v. Swan, 34 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). See also Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, __ & n.136 (1987) (citing Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi
Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 750 (8th Cir.) (refusing to vacate arbitral award in case where “arbitrators’ decision
does not clearly delineate the law applied, nor expound the reasoning and analysis used”), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2249 (1986); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-16 (2d Cir. 1972) (carefully distinguishing
between mistaken constructions of law and manifest disregard of the law); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc.,
466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (“arbitrator’s decision must be upheld unless it is ‘completely irrational.’”
(quoting Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382 (1972)); Sidarma Societa Italiana Di Armamento Spa., Venice v.
Holt Marine Ind., 515 F. Supp. 1302, 1308-09 (S.D.N.Y.) (requiring difficiult to prove deliberate or intentional
disregard of the law in order to come within manifest disregard review), aff’d, 681 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Some courts will reverse an arbitrator’s awards for straying outside the law. The Third Circuit recently
refused to enforce an arbitrator’s award that “comported with the arbitrator’s view of fairness,” rather than
drawing its essence from the applicable collective bargaining agreement. CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper,
Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Eneregy Workers Intl. Union Local No. 2-991, ____, No. 03-1503 (3d Cir. Oct.
14, 2004).
184
EDMUND H.T. SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 40-43 (18th ed. 1920); ELIAS MERWIN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 72-79 (1895)
185
Anton Hermann Chroust, The “Common Good” and the Problem of “Equity” in the Philosophy of Law
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Moreover, Equity’s decision had no precedential effect even in Equity,
much less in Law.186
Similarly, ADR stands in the shadow of the substantive law yet resorts
to another regime to resolve the dispute among the parties before them.187
Mediators, for example, “do not ‘judge’; they aid the parties in ending a
dispute.”188 Arbitrators, too, are informed by their “experience, knowledge
of the customs of the trade and fair and good sense for equitable relief.”189
After all, the early definition of an arbitration is “a deciding, according to
one’s will or pleasure; uncontrolled or absolute decision.”190 An ADR
neutral thus may facilitate or impose a resolution that neither comports with
nor undermines the dominant substantive principles. And that resolution,
too, has no precedential effect. While liberating, this ability to act “in
personam” is also limiting. ADR cannot establish the precedential effect
that may be useful in some circumstances.191 Equity suffered the same
infirmity.192
One final similarity bears mention. Both Equity and ADR recognized
certain limits to their equitable competency. Equity didn’t correct all
injustices. In fact, Equity left untouched, in full force and operation, a great
number of legal rules which were certainly as harsh, unjust, and
unconscientious as any of those which they did attack.193 In a similar way,
of St. Thomas Aquinas, 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 114, 117 (1942–1943)
186
See n. __ infra and accompanying text.
187
Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1987).
188
Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 26 (1987).
189
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 721 n.83(1999) (emphasis added) (citing I GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 25.01 at 391 (rev. ed. 1995)).
See also Colin P. Campbell, The Court of Equity—A Theory of its Jurisdiction, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 111
(1903) (equity can “recognize and enforce principles which actually govern society in general, whether embodied
in the so-called rules of law or not.”).
190
1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 426 (1971) (quoting the “obsolete” definition). The contemporary
definition is equally telling. It reads: “The settlement of a dispute or question at issue by one to whom the
conflicting parties agree to refer their claims in order to obtain an equitable decision.” Id. (emphasis added). In
Black’s Dictionary, the reference to a substantive baseline is conspicuously absent. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY ___ (8th ed. 2004) (“A process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders
a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard.”).
Note the use of the word in arbitration in Professor Pomeroy’s admonition about the dangers of a farreaching jurisprudence of Equity:
An accurate conception of equity is indispensable to the due administration of justice. If a certain theory of its
nature, which now prevails to some extent, should become universal, it would soon destroy all sense of
certainty and security which the citizen has, and should have, in respect to the existence and maintenance of
his juridical rights…. It needs no argument to show that if this notion should become universally accepted as
the true definition of equity, every decision would be a virtual arbitration, and all certainty in legal rules and
security of legal rights would be lost.

1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 43 at 44 (2d ed. 1892).
191
See, e.g., Donald J. Friedman & Michael D. Broaddus, Computer Contract Disputes in the 1990s:
Choosing ADR or Litigation, 5 No. 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 6 (1993).
192
EDMUND H.T. SNELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 40-43 (18th ed. 1920); ELIAS MERWIN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 72-79 (1895)
193
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 50 at 50-51 (2d ed. 1892) (“It is
absolutely certain from all the existing records, and from the result itself of their work, that they did not refrain
from deciding any particular case, according to their views of equity and good conscience, merely because the
doctrine which they followed or established in making the decision was inconsistent with the rule of law
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the ADR movement has not suggested that every legal dispute has a nonjudicial solution. Indeed, the ADR literature recognizes that some types of
cases are not suited to resolution outside the courtroom, including
particularly cases in which the plaintiff seeks a declaration of law by the
court.194
4. The Reflection and Reinforcement of Community Norms
Another motive fueling interest in ADR is its ability to enhance
“community involvement in the dispute resolution process.”195 This
involvement takes two forms. First, ADR empowers neighborhoods to
resolve disputes that are not cognizable in or are otherwise ignored by
formal dispute resolution systems.196 And second, ADR incorporates local
values and norms into the decision-making calculus.197 These values and
norms tend to emphasize compromise, reconciliation and fairness.198 Thus
while formal adjudication can be “a fight unto death in which irreparable
harm (economic, psychological, and spiritual) is done to parties,” ADR
respects “compromise and human growth” rooted in fundamental moral and
spiritual principles.199
The excesses of adversarialism, the importance of reaching the merits,
and a morally-infused understanding of justice have already been discussed
in section A of this Part II and in previous subparts of this section B. The
applicable to the same facts, nor because the law had deliberately and intentionally refused to acknowledge the
existence of a primary right, or to give a remedy under those facts and circumstances. That this corrective
authority was possessed by the chancellors, and freely exercised by them in the periods of which I am speaking, is
recognized by the ancient writers.”); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430
(noting that among the legal rules with which equity did not interfere: The doctrine by which the lands of a debtor
were generally exempted from all liability for his simple contract debts); Earl of Bath v. Sherwin, 10 Mod. 4 (“A
collateral warranty was certainly one of the harshest and most cruel parts of the common law, because there was
no such pretended recompense (as in the case of a lineal warranty); yet I do not find that the court (of chancery)
ever gave satisfaction.”)
194
See nn. __ and accompanying text, infra.
195
LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH
RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003) (“To
improve public satisfaction with the justice system; … To restore the influence of neighborhood and community
values and the cohesiveness of communities.”)
196
See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of
Innovation Co-Opted or “The Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (recounting the history of
neighborhood justice centers); ROMAN TOMASIC & MALCOLM M. FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE:
ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA (1982); DANIEL MCGILLIS, COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
197
See generally Valerie A. Sanchez, Back to the Future of ADR: Negotiating Justice and Human Needs, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2003).
198
See generally Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660
(1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now a Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality, and the Practice of
Justice and Conflict Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1073 (2001).
199
Joseph Allegretti, A Christian Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997
(2001) (citing Robert D. Taylor, Toward a Biblical Theology of Litigation: A Law Professor Looks at 1 Cor. 6:111, 2 EX AUDITU 105, 109 (1986); Wayne D. Brazil, The Attorney as Victim: Toward More Candor About the
Psychological Price Tag of Litigation Practice, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 107 (1978-1979)).
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reflection and reinforcement of community norms also raises issues of
access to courts; those issues are addressed immediately in subpart 5, infra.
5. Access to Justice
Proponents of ADR also emphasize the system’s ability to broaden
access to justice.200 ADR initiatives can improve access to justice for
individuals lacking the means and wherewithal to overcome the
intimidating and confusing setting of courtroom or to navigate the formal
rules of procedure and evidence.201
The recourse to legal actors and proceedings is costly, emotionally
debilitating, and potentially counterproductive. In many respects, justice has
become an empty façade; the august wisdom and high-minded discipline of
the law merely create an appearance of dispensing what is right and just
among parties in dispute. Although adjudication provides coercive finality to
conflicts, the pathway to justice is dehumanizing and riddled with abusive
interpretations of the truth.202

ADR becomes the means for enabling “access to justice” when adjudication
fails.203
Equity was similarly concerned with access issues, and asserted
jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against defendants who were too
powerful locally for justice to be obtainable against them by regular
means.204 Indeed, one commentator referred to this as “[t]he most important
of the judicial functions of the Chancellor.”205 Access to Chancery was
facilitated by a simple procedure.206 And whereas Chancery charged a fee
for obtaining writ, there was no fee in Equity.207
200
LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, ABRIDGED
EDITION 2 (2d ed. 1998). See also STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER, NANCY H. ROGERS & SARAH
RUDOLPH COLE, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 8 (4th ed. 2003) (“To
provide accessible forums to people with disputes; To teach the public to try more effective processes than
violence or ligiation for settling disputes”).
201
See generally Larry R. Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Poor: Is It An Alternative?, 70 N.D.
L. REV. 269 (1994).
202
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1 (1989).
203
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 244-45 (1995); Leonard S. Rubenstein, Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the
Adversary System, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 48 (1976).
204
J. L. Barton, Equity in the Medieval Common Law, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 140, 145-46 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1973).
205
Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 93
(1934) (“Most of the early petitions seem to have originated in the fact that the defendant was so rich or so
powerful that he could not be brought into court in the usual way. The phrase “he is of too great a maintenance” is
often found in these bills. The early equity jurisprudence appears to have consisted of cases where, although there
might have been a remedy at law, yet because the petitioner was poor and the defendant was rich and powerful,
the legal remedy was not satisfactory.”). See also Vance, Law in Action in Mediaeval England, 17 VA. L. REV. 1.
206
See nn. __ supra.
207
Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 88 (1934).

E.g., John Feyrewyn v. Richard the Carpenter, 30 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT BILLS IN EYRE 6 (1292). It is
addressed to Sir John de Berewick (one of the King’s Justiciars), “you who are put in the place of our Lord
the King to do right to poor and rich.” The plaintiff, of Shrewsbury, says that he paid the defendant six marks,
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III. TRADITIONAL LAW AND EQUITY—THE DIALECTIC IN PRACTICE
Much of the grand history of Anglo-American law could be
characterized as an epic struggle between the regimes of law and equity.208
We revere law and the rule of law yet contrive to avoid legalism.209 That the
law must be applied uniformly may be “the most basic principle of
jurisprudence.”210 Yet a right too rigid hardens into wrong.211 Equity plays a
strange role in the structure of law; separate from, and yet a part of the legal
norms.212 As complements and as rivals, separate systems of Law and
Equity combined to administer the laws for centuries with both certainty
and discretion.213
The king’s courts and the Law courts could have maintained some
flexibility and liberality by simply accepting the new writs that were issued
receiving in return the defendant’s undertaking in writing to furnish plaintiff, who was getting ready to go to
the Holy Land on pilgrimage, with board and loding meanwhile. But the wicked defendant will not keep his
agreement; instead of which he only gives plaintiff occasionally a morsel of bread just as if plaintiff were a
pauper begging alms for God’s sake. Unless his Lordship helps the plaintiff before he (his Lordship) leaves
town, plaintiff will never get his money back, for the defendant is clerk of the bailiff of Shrewsbury, and the
rich folk of this town all work together to keep the poor from getting their rights. Plaintiff has no money to
hire a pleader, but if his Lordship will graciously see to it that plaintiff gets his money back, the latter will set
out for the Holy Land, and there he will pray for the King and for his Lordship also.

Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760 n.17 (1945).

. See generally ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (rev. ed. 1954)
(“Almost all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental one of rule and discretion, of
administration of justice by law and administration of justice by the more or less trained intuition of experienced
magistrates”); KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 17 (1969) (“Every
governmental and legal system in world history has involved both rules and discretion. No government has ever
been a government of laws and not of men in the sense of eliminating all discretionary power. Every government
has always been a government of laws and of men.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
24–25 (1990) (“[F]or more than two millennia, the field of jurisprudence has been fought over by two distinct
though variegated groups. One contends that law is more than politics and in the hands of skillful judges
yields . . . correct answers to even the most difficult legal questions. The other contends that law is politics
through and through and that judges exercise broad discretionary authority.”). See also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO,
PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE, RELIGION, HISTORY, LAW, AND LITERATURE 163-193 (1983).
209
Lord Justice Evershed, Equity After Fusion: Federal or Confederate, THE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF
PUBLIC TEACHERS OF LAW 171, 171 (1948).
210
. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982). See also BENJAMIN
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112 (1921); GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE 173 n.13
(Edinburgh ed., 1952) (“the worst misfortune of a civilized people is doubt about the impartiality of justice”)
(internal citation and quotation omitted); GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 25–27(1988).
211
Charles D. Frierson, A Certain Fundamental Difference in Viewpoint Between Law and Equity as
Illustrated by Two Maxims, 22 CASE & COMMENT 403, 405 (1915). See JOHN SALMOND, FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
JURISPRUDENCE 97-98 (1893); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 303 (2nd ed. 1921); H.
Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 809 (1961) (“Morality must
form a part of our legal norms unless we are prepared to discard our moral convictions at the points of strain at
which moral insights are most needed.”); Harlan F. Stone, Book Review, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (1918).
212
G. Radbruch, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft 75 (9th ed. 1952) (“The dilemma that equity is to be
better than justice and yet not quite opposed to justice, but rather a kind of justice, has troubled men as early as
Aristotle’s famous chapter V 14 of the Nichomachean Ethics.”). See generally Ralph A. Newman, Introduction in
EQUITY IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 15, 15-16 (Ralph A. Newman ed., 1973).
213
. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 17 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (“[F]or
two centuries before the year 1875 the two systems had been working together harmoniously”).
208
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by the Chancery.214 Had the Law courts accepted these necessary
innovations, instead of becoming bemused by form and precedent, there
may have been no need for the creation of a special, competing court and an
alternative system of law.215 Instead, the common law became a narrow,
formalistic system, confined to the method of granting relief by the award
of damages after an injury had been suffered.216 Other, preventive or special
relief was not available from the common law courts.217 Practical
circumstances demanded some adaptability and elasticity, and Chancery
filled that void.
English law was thus split into dual systems, with equity and law
flowing in separate channels. By requiring the specific performance of
contracts, enjoining the repetition of a trespass or nuisance, appointing a
receiver to prevent a defendant from destroying property that was the
subject of an action, or ordering an accounting, Equity supplemented the
Common Law.218 These and many other remedies considered essential to
the administration of any meaningful system of justice were simply
unavailable in the Law Courts. By contrast, Equity had at its disposal a
broad array of remedies to redress a given wrong.
[C]ourts of common law cannot give the desired relief. They have no forms of
remedy adapted to the objects. They can entertain suits only in a prescribed
form, and they can give a general judgment only in the prescribed form.219
From their very character and organization they are incapable of the remedy,
which the mutual rights and relative situations of the parties, under the
circumstances, positively require…. But courts of equity are not so restrained.
Although they have prescribed forms of proceeding, the latter are flexible, and
may be suited to the different postures of cases. They may adjust their decrees,
so as to meet most, if not all, of these exigencies; and they may vary, qualify,
restrain, and model the remedy, so as to suit it to mutual and adverse claims,
controlling equities; and the real and substantial rights of all the parties.”220

In this regard, Equity was but a useful “appendix” to the common law.221

214

See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 36 (1951). One
commentator has suggested that the law-equity dialectic, though causal, was working in the opposite direction.
See “Bona Fides,” Equity Imported into Common Law, 69 SOLICITOR’S J. & WKLY. RPTR. 339, 340 (Feb. 14,
1925) (“The result of the growth of equity was that the equitable development of the Common Law was nipped in
the bud.”).
216
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
217
Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 36 (1951).
218
. See WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 28 (1930) (describing purpose of uses was to avoid
the rigors of the common law which forbad testamentary gifts of land as well as inter vivos transfers except by
livery of seisin); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 4–7 (Chaytor ed. 1909);
Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV. L. REV. 171 (1936).
219
MITFORD, EQUITY PLEADING 3-4 (Jeremy, ed. ___); 1 WOODES., LECTURES vii, 203-206.
220
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 27 at 19 (12th ed. 1877).
221
. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 19(Chaytor ed. 1 909) (“I do
not think that any one has expounded or ever will expound equity as a single, consistent system, an articulate body
of law. It is a collection of appendixes between which there is no very close connection.”).
215
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Yet the conflict between the two systems was palpable.222 The very
growth of equity, as long as it was in its formative period, was from its
essential nature an antagonism to the common law, either by way of
restraining the prosecution of actions at law, by adding doctrines and rules
which the law simply did not contain, or by way of negating rights that the
law had settled.223 Of course, Equity did not restrain a judge or officer of
the Law Courts.224 Nor did Equity deny the operation of the rules of law.225
It sought only to neutralize them by compelling the defendant to relinquish
the benefits of those rules in accordance with its decree.226 In this narrow
sense, then, law and equity did not “conflict.”227 But in the broader sense it
is not even “fairly open to question” that Equity summoned a higher law
and adopted doctrines directly contrary to the Law courts.228
A. Equity’s Reforming Influence on the Law Courts
Although Law and Equity operated as dual systems for centuries, Equity
had an undeniable reforming influence on the Law courts.229 This section
offers many examples of instances where doctrines and rules that were once
exclusively recognized and enforced by Chancery were incorporated into
the Law whether by statute or by judicial decision. Indeed, over time the
Common Law became increasingly “equitized.”230 The enumeration of
several examples serves two purposes. First, from an evidentiary
perspective, they illustrate the dialectic of law and equity in operation.

222
Conflicts of jurisdiction “went on, constantly increasing, till at last, they produced an explosion which
shook Westminster Hall to its center.” 2 CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 317 (4th ed. 1856); see
also JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 44 (5th ed. 1941); BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 17-18
(7th ed. 1905); POTTER, HISTORY OF EQUITY 11, 13 (1931).
223
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 48 at 49 (2d ed. 1892) (“It would
be a downright absurdity, a flat contradiction to the plainest teachings of history, to deny that the process of
building up the system of equity involved and required on the part of the chancellors an evasion, disregard, and
even open violation of many established rules of the common law.”); Harlan F. Stone, Book Review, 18
COLUMBIA L. REV. 97 (1918) (“[I]t seems extraordinary that any writer should ever have asserted broadly that
there was no conflict between the doctrines of law and equity.”) See also Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the
New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244 (1945); Hohfeld, The Relation Between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. REV. 537
(1913); Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 326 (1846); BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 151 (1916).
224
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
225
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
226
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
227
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 16-18 (1920); Christopher
Columbus Langdell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 HARV. L. REV. 58 (1887); James B. Ames, Purchase
for Value Without Notice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1887).
228
Harlan Fiske Stone, Book Review, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 97, 98 (1918). See also nn. __, supra.
229
George Palmer Garrett, The Heel of Achilles, 11 VA. L. REV. 32 (1924-25) (“The Common Law has
plagiarized many things from Chancery.”).
230
7 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 74, 75 (1926). See also Brendan F.
Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325 (1935-1936); 1 JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 69 at 73-74 (2d ed. 1892).

11-Mar-05

ADR: THE NEW EQUITY

43

Second, they illustrate the positive role that equity can play in the moral
growth of the law.231
In the early stages of English law, certain agreements could be enforced
only if the instrument sought to be enforced respected certain formalities,
oftentimes a seal.232 The formalities served channeling and cautionary
functions,233 but also served as a bright-line test for the early Law judges,
who had very little discretion.234 Promises that were not enforceable in Law,
however, could be enforced in Equity.235 Equity, “the sometimes moral
policeman of the law,” looked beyond the mere form of a transaction.236
Recognizing the sanctity of contract, and the resulting moral obligation to
honor one’s promises, Equity could enforce the promise otherwise
unenforceable.237 In response to the more evolved position of Chancery, and
in fear of losing a competitive advantage,238 the Law courts ultimately
developed and expanded the action of Assumpsit to enforce a range of
promises, including unsealed and oral promises.239
The formalities of contract law had also bound the Law courts to a rule
that allowed a creditor to recover a second time from a debtor who had paid
his debt in full but had neglected to obtain a formal release or a surrender of
the contract.240
231

E. Hocking, The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and of Rights 2 (1926); O. Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its
history is the history of the moral development of the race.”)
232
JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 98 (1913); Frederick E. Crane, The Magic of the Private
Seal, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1915); Harold D. Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early English Law, 10 COLUM.
L. REV. 608 (1910); Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 617 (1993).
233
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.16 at 86-87 (3d ed. 1999); Lon Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-03 (1941).
234
Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—Tension Between the
Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 509, 522-23 (2004).
235
Charles D. Frierson, A Certain Fundamental Difference in Viewpoint Between Law and Equity as
Illustrated by Two Maxims, 22 CASE & COMMENT 403, 412 (1915) (“Let us not forget the court of chancery was
the first to ignore the absence of a seal….”). See also 5 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 294-97 (7th ed. 1956); WILLARD T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY 16
(1914).
236
John McCarthy, Contemporary Advocacy: Value Free?, 38 CATH. LAW. 25, 38 (1998).
237
See generally Val D. Ricks, Contract Law and Christian Conscience, 2003 BYU L. REV. 993.
238
Willard T. Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL
AND LEGAL HISTORY 54, 66 (Paul Vinogradoff ed. 1974) (reprint of 1914 edition) (“In fact, there can be little
doubt that the eagerness displayed by certain judges to extend Assumpsit from misfeasance to nonfeasance was
prompted by the strong desire to retain jurisdiction that was fast slipping away.”); 2 WILLIAM SEARLE
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 456 (noting that the “competition of chancellor” awakened “even
the most conservative common law to the necessity of endeavouring to meet demands.”)
239
See, e.g., Slade’s Case, 4 COKE REPORT 92b, 76 ER 1074 (KB 1602) (presuming existence of a promise
from the fact of a debt and allowing Assumpsit to be brought on a simple promise to pay money). See generally
Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1182(1961); James Oldham, Reinterpretations of
18th-Century English Contract Theory: The View from Lord Mansfield’s Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1950-55
(1988); Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1983, 2083 (1985); William F.
Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 493 (1937-1938); Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and
Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21, 28-29 (1919-1920).
240
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 70 at 74-75 (2d ed. 1892).
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If he had paid without either getting an acquittance or having his bond
returned to him, he would have to pay again, not … because this result was in
itself desired, but because “the general grounds of the law of England heed
more what is good for many than what is good for one singular person
only..”241

The Common Law rule was that a sealed instrument could be discharged
only by another instrument of as high a character, or else by a surrender of
it so that the creditor could make profert of the instrument.242 A debtor
facing this situation could seek relief in Equity. The Chancellor would issue
an injunction against the creditor, enjoining him from enforcing the legal
judgment.243 Ultimately, the Law courts relaxed their jurisprudence to
incorporate such defenses as accord and satisfaction; these reforms ensured
a greater uniformity of results in Law as in Equity.244
Equity allowed recovery upon a lost instrument. Formalities in contract,
again the doctrine of profert in particular, also precluded a creditor from
enforcing an instrument that had been accidentally lost or destroyed.245 By
the formalities of the common law, the document was the debt;246 hence
there was no notion of secondary evidence of contents.247 Because Equity
could shape its remedial processes to meet any new emergency, it acquired
jurisdiction in this class of cases, and for a long time all suits upon such lost
negotiable paper were necessarily brought in equity. 248 The courts of Law
ultimately abrogated the ancient requirement of profert and, as in Equity,
allowed actions to recover a money judgment upon lost obligations or
negotiable instruments to be brought in courts of law according to the legal
modes of procedure.249
Equity introduced a moral view on the enforcement of penalties and
forfeitures.250 The Law courts rigidly exacted all penalties and enforced the
forfeitures of bonds issued in amounts considerably larger than the sum
borrowed unless the payment was done at precisely the time and in

241
S.F.C MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 250 (2d ed. 1981) (quoting ST.
GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT, Dialogue I, c.12 (Selden Society, vol. 91, pp. 77-79)).
242
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21,
32 (1919-1920).
243
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21,
32 (1919-1920).
244
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 70 at 74-75 (2d ed. 1892).
245
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 72 at 76-77 (2d ed. 1892).
246
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21,
32 (1919-1920).
247
See generally Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L.
REV. 753 (1945); FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 6–7 (Chaytor ed. 1909);
William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 483–86 (1938) (discussing “the reforming
influence of equity”).
248
James B Ames, Specialty Contracts and Equitable Defenses in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 104
(1913); 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 70 at 74-75 (2d ed. 1892).
249
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 71 at 76 (2d ed. 1892).
250
1 GEORGE SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 630 (1845).
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precisely the manner that had been stipulated.251 Yet penalties and
forfeitures of all types were avoidable in Equity.252 Equity looked beyond
the form of the transaction and to its substance.253 It gave the creditor an
amount that was just and equitable, usually principal, interest, and expenses
incurred by the creditor, 254 but would “restrain the creditor from suing at
law for the amount of the bond, on the ground that such a course was
unconscientious and oppressive.”255 Equity gradually extended this doctrine
to contracts other than those requiring the payment of money.256 These
equitable doctrines were slowly absorbed into the Common Law.257
Chancery assumed jurisdiction under any circumstances where the
remedy at law was not plain, adequate and complete.258 Hence there are
many other cases where Equity would intervene. Doctrines with respect to
fraud, undue influence, duress and mistake all originated in Equity.259
Equity also created the remedies of cancellation, restitution, and specific
performance.260 The protection by injunction of public or social rights is
derivative of Equity.”261 And the modern law of fiduciary duties, unfair
competition, trademarks, and business rights was developed in the Chancery
courts.262
Chancery also intervened when the procedures of the law courts were
inadequate. For example, equity interfered in the name—and with the
imprimatur—of efficiency to avoid the injurious effects of a multiplicity of
actions.263 Describing the contrast between law and equity in these
instances, Professor Chafee wrote:
251

1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 72 at 76-77 (2d ed. 1892).
D.E.C. YALE, Introduction, 2 LORD NOTTINGHAM’S CHANCERY CASES 8-15 (SELDEN SOCIETY 1957).
Two maxims of Equity were invoked here: “Equity looks on that as done, which in good conscience
ought to be done” and “Equity looks rather to the intent than to the form.” See CHARLES E. HOGG, EQUITY
PRINCIPLES §§ 327-328 at 451-55 (1900).
254
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21,
32 (1919-1920).
255
NORMAN FETTER, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 9 at 23-24 (1895).
256
NORMAN FETTER, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 9 at 24 (1895).
257
THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 677-78 (5th ed. 1956); Warren
B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 32-33 (19191920).
258
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text. In fact, in order to deny the jurisdiction of equity the remedy at
law had to be as “plain, certain, prompt, adequate, full, practical, just, final, complete, and efficient” as the remedy
in equity. See Thomas O. Main, Contemporary Equity and Traditional Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 451
(2003) (citations omitted).
259
Charles D. Frierson, A Certain Fundamental Difference in Viewpoint Between Law and Equity as
Illustrated by Two Maxims, 22 CASE & COMMENT 403, 412 (1915); William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22
MINN. L. REV. 479, 483 (1937-1938); Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 5 CAN. BAR REV. 308, 314 (1933).
260
Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 5 CAN. BAR REV. 308, 314 (1933).
261
William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 493 (1937-1938).
262
Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, __ TEX. L. REV. 244, 251 (citing Jones, Historical
Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE L.J. 905 (1926); MUND, MONOPOLY: A HISTORY AND
THEORY (1933); WATKINS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1927)); Deborah A. DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880-81 (1985) (discussing the
equitable origins of fiduciary duties); L. S. SEALY, FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 60
(1962) (same).
263
. The reference to a “multiplicity of actions” can be confusing because equity exercised jurisdiction in
252
253
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A common-law action soon came to be a two-sided affair, usually with only
one plaintiff and one defendant but sometimes with several plaintiffs or
defendants tightly bound together as joint obligees or obligors, etc. Except in
such joint situations, however, a dispute of one person against many persons
usually had to come before the law courts, if at all, in the form of many
separate actions. Hence it was far cheaper and more convenient to have a
single suit in chancery, which was accustomed to handle polygonal
controversies . . . . [I]t was an obvious waste of time to try . . . common
question[s] of law and fact over and over in separate actions at law . . . . It was
much more economical to get everybody into a single chancery suit and settle
the common questions once and for all.264

Thus, a court of equity would hear a controversy to prevent a multiplicity of
suits, even if the exercise of such jurisdiction called for adjudication on
purely legal rights and to confer purely legal relief.265 Moreover, when the
number of plaintiffs or defendants were too numerous to join in a single
suit, equity would permit a few of the litigants to represent the many in
connection with an equitable bill of peace, the ancestor of the contemporary
class action.266
In reforming the law of property, Equity recognized ownership in the
beneficiary of a trust. At common law, title to tangible real property could
pass only by livery of seisin, which generally required the physical presence
of the parties on the land.267 Thus, in a conveyance to A for the use of B, the
Law courts denied any claim of title in B and refused to recognize that B
four types of cases involving a multiplicity of actions—(i) where the nature of the wrong is such that at law it
would be necessary for the injured party, in order to obtain complete relief, to bring a number of actions, arising
from the same wrongful act against the same wrongdoer; (ii) where a party institutes, or is about to institute, a
number of successive or simultaneous actions against another party, all depending upon the same legal questions
and similar issues of fact; (iii) where a party claims a common right against a number of persons, the
establishment of which would require a separate legal action brought by him against each of such persons, and
which are of such a nature that they might be determined in a single suit in equity brought against all of such
persons; and (iv) where a number of persons have separate and distinct rights of action against the same party,
arising from the same cause, governed by the same legal rule, and involving similar facts, and the circumstances
are such that the rights of all may be settled in a single suit. See generally 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A
TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 243–275, at 318–377 (2d ed. 1892). References herein to a
“multiplicity of actions” refer to group (iv). See also HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY § 178 (2d ed. 1948) (“the plight of a defendant at law, subjected to one hundred and ten separate actions
arising from the same accident, many of the actions being brought in different counties and some of them set for
trial in the different counties at the same time, so that it would be impossible for the witnesses for the defense to
attend each trial, is one that calls for some sort of relief if it can be given”) (citing S. Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 47 So.
274 (1908)).
264
. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200–01 (1950).
265
. Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 79 WASH. L. REV. 429, 492 (2003)
(citations omitted).
266
. See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 269, at 367-68 (2d ed.
1892) (“[T]he jurisdiction may and should be exercised, either on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants
against a single party, or on behalf of a single party against such a numerous body, although there is no ‘common
title,’ nor ‘community of right’ or of ‘interest in the subject-matter,’ among these individuals, but where there is
and because there is merely a community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the
general controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded and obtained by or against each individual
member of the numerous body.”). See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200 (1950).
267
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21,
32 (1919-1920).
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had any right therein.268 In fact, B could be sued at Law for trespass in
taking the rents and profits. Equity, however, recognized B as the beneficial
owner, held A to be a mere trustee for B, and would enjoin A from
prosecuting any action at law against B. “This recognized the principles of
trusts, which in its many phases equity has always fostered.”269 (Equity
similarly respected a trust with regard to tangible personal property, and
also the right to transfer title to intangible personalty, or choses in
action.270) Equity’s action in the development of uses practically eliminated
most of the obsolete doctrines of feudalism after feudalism ceased to exist
as an active social and governmental system. This led directly to the
enactment of the Statute of Uses. Although aimed at restoring tax revenues
to Henry VIII, the Statute made it possible to convey legal title by written
deed, replacing conveyances by livery of seisin, and to create future
executory estates impossible under the old law. The Statute also destroyed
the power to devise land by will recognized by Equity, and resulted in the
adoption of the Statute of Willis to restore such power.271
The theory of mortgages is a direct result of the carrying over into the
law of the principles established by the Chancellor’s Court in the early part
of the seventeenth century. Equity, though recognizing the purely technical
legal title of the mortgagee, enforced the real ownership of the mortgagor
by establishing his equity of redemption, and by charging the mortgagee as
a trustee if he exercised his legal right to take over possession of the
mortgaged property and collected the rents and profits. Equity treated the
legal title and right of possession as existing in the mortgagee only for the
purpose of establishing and protecting his security for payment of the
mortgage debt.272
B. The Ossification of Equity
(or The Common Law’s Reforming Influence on Equity)
What starts as a boon often ends as a boomerang.273 Earnest, “[s]imple,
inexpensive and speedy in its origins,” by the eighteenth century Equity had
268
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21,
32 (1919-1920) (citing WILLIAM W. BILLSON, EQUITY IN ITS RELATIONS TO COMMON LAW 167 (1917); Kenelm
E. DIGBY, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 320 (5th ed. 1897)).
269
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21,
32 (1919-1920).
270
Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816 (1916); Walter
Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston, 30 HARV. L. REV. 449
(1917); William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 484 (1937-1938).
271
William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 483 (1937-1938); GEORGE L. CLARK,
EQUITY: AN ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF MODERN EQUITY PROBLEMS § 246 at 327-28 (Stephens 1924)
(1919); 1536, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10; 4 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 49 (1924).
272
William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 484-85 (1937-1938).
273
Robert L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 106
(1934).
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became idly corrupt, “exceedingly complicated, unbelievably slow, and
inexcusably expensive.”274 When Chancery contracted the pathogens of
strict law, it suffered a fate worse than that which plagued the Common
Law.275
In the early seventeenth century, a process of systematization was
underway.276 For many centuries the sweeping jurisdiction of Equity had
been untrammeled by any definite rule.277 Equity was a successful
competitor vis-à-vis the Law courts, and was doing useful things.278 But this
popularity also brought a craving for certainty; as soon as a system of law
becomes reduced to completeness of outward form, “it has a natural
tendency to crystallize into a rigidity unsuited to the free applications which
the actual circumstances of human life demand.”279 Hence Chancery could
not remain a “fountain of unlimited dispensations.”280 To reform the
“heterogeneous medley of empirical remedies,”281 Bacon issued one
hundred rules of equity that were “wisely conceived, and expressed with the
greatest precision and perspicuity.”282
Continuing thereafter, particularly under the Chancellorships of Lord
Nottingham and Lord Hardwicke,283 the exercise of equity became more
circumscribed and predictable.284 Chancery no longer “decide[d] every
274

Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. REV. 112 (1934).
CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 228-29 (1927) (“The situation was bad enough at law, but
much worse in equity.”)
276
. Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834, 858-59 (1918)
(dating “the change” in equity to the era of James I). See generally Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity:
Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal Christian Influences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on the Evolution of
Legal Equitable Remedies, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 483 (1997); Timothy S. Haskett, The Medieval English Court of
Chancery, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 245 (1996).
277
. See supra notes ___ and accompanying text. See also 1 JOHN FONBLANQUE, A TREATISE OF EQUITY
§ 3 (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall, 1st ed. 1793) (“So there will be a necessity of having recourse to natural
principles, that what is wanting to the finite may be supplied out of that which is infinite. And this is properly
what is called equity, in opposition to strict law . . . . And thus in chancery every particular case stands upon its
own particular circumstances; and, although the common law will not decree against the general rule of law, ye
chancery doth, so as the example introduce not a general mischief. Every matter, therefore, that happens
inconsistent with the design of the legislator, or is contrary to natural justice, may find relief here.”).
278
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
279
SHELDON AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 57 (1875).
280
. Frederick Pollock, The Transformation of Equity, in FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND ETHICS 293 (1882) (Chancery became “as regular a court of jurisdiction as any other”); FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 9 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (“In the second half of the sixteenth
century the jurisprudence of the court is becoming settled.”).
281
. Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, 11 CAN. B. REV. 308, 315 (1938).
282
. 2 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF
ENGLAND 134 (5th ed. 1868) (“They are the foundation of the practice of the Court of Chancery, and are still cited
as authority.”).
283
. Lord Nottingham served as Lord Chancellor from 1673 to 1682. See generally 4 JOHN CAMPBELL,
LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 236–79 (5th ed. 1868). Lord
Hardwicke served from 1736 to 1756. See generally 6 JOHN CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND
KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND 158-304 (5th ed. 1868).
284
. See Walter E. Sparks, The Origin, Growth and Present Scope of Equity Jurisprudence in England and
the United States, 16 W. JURIST 473, 477 (1882) (“as time passed on . . . opposition gradually diminished”). See,
e.g., Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 413, 428 (1802) (“The cases which occur are various, but they are decided
on fixed principles. Courts of equity have in this respect no more discretionary power than courts of law. They
decide new cases, as they arise, by the principles on which former cases have been decided, and may then
275
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individual case according to the result of a sort of ransacking search for the
particular set of conscientious principles applicable to the case.”285
Chancery began to respect precedent.286 And as Nottingham and Hardwicke
“deliberately set out to reduce equity to a system of rules established by
precedent,”287 the jurisdiction of equity “crystallized.”288
But one commentator’s crystallization is another’s ossification. As the
jurisdiction of equity lost its youthful exuberance, so also its freedom,
elasticity and luminance.289 Equity lost religion and found procedure.290 The
administration of equity, much like the administration of law became
“entangled in the intricacies of its own processes and broken down of its
own weight.”291 Corruption made things worse.292 For litigants, Chancery
illustrate or enlarge the operation of those principles; but the principles are as fixed and certain as the principles
on which the courts of common law proceed.”).
285
. H.G. Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, 45 L.Q. REV. 196, 205 (1929).
286
As early as 1663, in an aggravated case of fraud Lord Clarendon dismissed the plaintiff’s bill for lack of a
precedent. See Roberts v. Wynn, 1 Chan.Rep. 236, 21 Eng. Rep. 560. See also Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swans. 585,
591 (1672) (discussing the logic of consistency); Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of Trust
Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319, 321-22 n.12 (1935-1936) (discussing Cook and noting that the tendency
toward stare decisis increased in Chancery throughout the eighteenth century); George W. Keeton, Bacon as a
Chancery Judge, 18 IOWA L. REV. 476, 476 (1932-1933) (suggesting that respect for precedent was not
introduced in Equity until the eighteenth century); Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity,
12 TEX. L. REV. 112 (1934) (suggesting that Chancery was far more deeply in bondage to precedent than was the
common law); 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 59 at 59-60 (2d ed. 1892)
(quoting Lord Keeper Bridgman, “Certainly, precedents are very necessary and useful to us, for in them we may
find the reasons of the equity to guide us; and besides, the authority of those who made them is much to be
regarded. We shall suppose that they did it upon great consideration and weighing of the matter, and it would be
very strange and very ill if we should disturb and set aside what has been the course for a long series of time and
ages.”).
287
. Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 105-06
(1934). Hardwicke “labored indefatigably to forge those positive precepts which in his estimation would best
‘externalize the traditional philosophy of Chancery.’” Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of
Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319, 319 (1935–1936); H.G. Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, 178
LAW QRTLY REV. 12 (Apr. 1929) (suggesting that Nottingham initiated the first transformation of equity “from a
heterogeneous medley of isolated empirical reliefs into a stable and increasingly rigid system of rules”)
Some commentators credit (blame?) Eldon for completing the process of defining and limiting Equity. See 1
WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 468 (3d ed. 1922).
288
. See H. G. Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, 45 L.Q. REV. 196, 205 (1929) (Nottingham “stiffened
and rationalized old ideas and turned them to permanent and practical use.”); id. at 196 (detailing “the
transformation from a heterogonous medley of isolated, empirical beliefs into a stable and increasingly rigid
system of rules.”). See also James O’Connor, Thoughts About the Common Law, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 161, 164
(1928) (referring to the “crystallized conscience” of equity). See generally FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 9 (Chaytor ed. 1909) (noting that during the sixteenth century, “[t]he day for
ecclesiastical Chancellors is passing away”); Paul Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century
Jurisprudence, 24 LAW Q. REV. 373 (1908); BARBARA SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE, RELIGION,
HISTORY, LAW, AND LITERATURE (1983); 6 JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 158 (5th
ed. 1868).
289
. See Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., The Spirit of Equity, 16 B.U. L. REV. 345, 345 (1936) (“Equity became
handcuffed by a rigorous body of rules and concepts.”); see also id. at 351 (“The times were not suitable for
reasoned discretion. The public demanded certainty.”).
290
See generally 1-2 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., MODERN PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN EQUITY (1894) (two
volume set of Equity pleading rules); EDWARD HUGHES, THE EQUITY DRAFTSMAN (1st Amer. ed. 1832) (from 2nd
London ed.) (a tome of nearly one thousand pages describing the procedural rules of Suits in Equity). See also
WALTER C. CLEPHANE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1926).
291
. Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. REV. 112 (1934). See 1
WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 426 (5th ed. 1931) (“Firstly a suit in equity very
often lasted very many years. This no doubt is true of some common law actions; but it is clear that the fact that
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became a nightmare. Five years was a minimum for a creditors’ bill to be
disposed of, even where there was neither exception nor appeal.293
Sometimes a case was delayed over thirty years.294 Chancery thus became a
jus strictum differing little from the common law except in point of identity
of the judicial decisions it had made its own.295 Indeed, by the first quarter
of the nineteenth century, equity had become “so fixed, so certain, that
lawyers could say, ‘There is nothing new in equity.’”296
This legalization of Equity was happening simultaneously with the
equitization of the Law described supra.297 The alternative appearance of
law and equity as the mutual checks and corrections of one another are
lasting and not transitory phenomena. No longer “discrete conversants,” the
two systems had “begun to be ‘integrated,’ ‘melded,’ or ‘collapsed’ into
each other.”298
C. The Merger of Law and Equity
The merger of law and equity consummated the centuries-long
relationship of cooperation and competition between the two systems.299
With equity “legalized,” it was assumed that the usefulness of the separate
court was exhausted.300 Differences between the systems were viewed as
many equitable cases involved the taking of accounts and enquiries, necessarily made the proceedings more
lengthy than the general run of common law actions, which turned on a clear cut issue of fact or law.”); Charles
Synge Christopher & Baron Bowen, Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian Period, in 1
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516, 529 (1907) (“‘No man, as things now stand,’ says in
1839 Mr. George Spence, the author of the well-known work on the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of
Chancery, ‘can enter into a Chancery suit with any reasonable hope of being alive at its termination, if he has a
determined adversary.’”). A vivid picture of the technicalities, delays, and expense involved in a suit in chancery
is to be found in the case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, as related in Charles Dickens’ BLEAK HOUSE (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1956) (1853). Some have suggested that Dickens’ negative depiction is exaggerated. See generally
WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN (Yale Univ. 1929).
292
Michael Lobban, Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of Chancery, Part II,
22 LAW & HIST. REV. 565 (2004); Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L.
REV. 109, 112-113 (1934).
293
COOPER, PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT RELATIVE TO DEFECTS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY 86 (1828)
as quoted in 9 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 433 (1926).
294
9 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 375 (1926).
295
. See Douglas M. Gane, The Birth of a New Equity, 67 THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL 572, 572 (1923). See
also Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319, 325 (19351936) (“In the eighteenth century . . . not only was Chancery following the law, but the Common Law in turn was
becoming more and more equitized.”); 1 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 74–75
(7th ed. 1956).
296
. Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 106
(1934).
297
Bryant Smith, Legal Relief Against the Inadequacies of Equity, 12 TEX. L. REV. 109 (1934) (tracing key
elements of reforms in Law and Equity to the middle of the eighteenth century).
298
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 214 (1995) (referring to a theory about the evolution of the systems of ADR and
formal adjudication).
299
This story has been narrated. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, ___ (1987); Thomas O.
Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
300
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merely procedural, and a widespread and escalating contempt for procedure
suggested that any distinctions were impractical and unnecessary.301 There
was little tolerance for the delays, the expense, and the technical
complications that resulted from maintaining separate courts of law and
equity. 302 Procedure could better fulfill its functional and secondary role if
a single set of procedural rules facilitated the joint administration of the
substantive principles of both law and equity.303
I have argued elsewhere that in merging the regimes of law and equity,
reformers may have swept away part of the wisdom that guided the
development and operation of dual systems.304 One virtue of an autonomous
system of equity was its authority to act in opposition to the strict law when
the unique circumstances of a particular case demanded intervention.305 The
architects of the merger took great pains to sustain this virtue by preserving
the substantive principles of both law and equity; only the procedure was
modified, they insisted.306 But even assuming that the antagonistic
substantive regimes of law and equity can co-exist and be applied
contemporaneously within a single unified procedural system, a
fundamental flaw inheres in the procedural infrastructure of a merged
system.307 For in denying equity any structural autonomy, there remains no
relief from the procedures of the merged system itself when the modes of
proceeding in that system are inadequate.308
Separate equity courts were given up because equity had been made into a body of rigid doctrines which were
applied quite as mechanically as the strict common law. Equity had become a sterile system and showed a
progressive decadence as an agency able to individualize justice. “The introduction of the common-law
theory of binding precedents and the result case-law equity…that made equity a system must in the end prove
fatal to it. In the very act of becoming a system it becomes legalized, and in becoming merely a competing
system of law insures its ultimate downfall.”

Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244, 246 (1945) (citing SNELL,
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (1868).
301
See generally Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429
(2003).
302
. See William Searle Holdsworth, Blackstone’s Treatment of Equity, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1928-1930).
See generally Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
303
See Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1925)Thomas O. Main,
Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
304
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
305
See William Searle Holdsworth, The Early History of Equity, 13 MICH. L. REV. 293, 293 (1913) (“the
root . . . of equity [is] the idea that the law should be fairly administered and that hard cases should as far as
possible be avoided”). BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 65 (1921) (““[W]hen the
social needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore
history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of larger ends.”); Colin C. Campbell, The Court of Equity—A Theory of
its Jurisdiction, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 110 (1903) (noting that principles of equity are a part of the larger concept of
fairness and justice upon which all law must be based).
306
See Ralph E. Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1 SYRACUSE L. REV. 186, 187
(1949). See also PHILEMON BLISS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF PLEADING 15 (3d ed. 1894) (codes “affect
modes of procedure”); Mildred Coe & Lewis Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field
Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 240-43 (1942); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: An
Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 329-30 (1988).
307
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 476-495
(2003).
308
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 495-514
(2003).
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Moreover, the assumption that a merged court can apply the substantive
principles of law and equity is an uncertain one. To be sure, many statutes
and common law doctrines have incorporated the fundamental equitable
principle of individualized justice. This principle is reflected in the
evolution of broad principles as opposed to narrow rules,309 broad grants of
discretionary authority,310 variable standards of conduct,311 balancing
tests,312 lee ways of precedent,313 and the acceptance of legal fictions.314
That equity intervenes when there is no adequate remedy at law is a most
familiar refrain.315 Courts frequently exercise their broad discretion to
award various equitable remedies. And courts have used the awesome
power of equity to create entirely new rights.316
Yet the legacy of Equity could not be fully preserved in a merged
system. Law and equity cannot be blended or homogenized because they
are fundamental antitheses.317 Each system has a function to perform which
requires some freedom to act upon the other.318 “To perform its high office,
equity must be administered as a check upon strict law and in opposition to
it. This requires for equity a selfhood.”319
309

. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 98, 158–62(1991); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV.
165 (1985).
310
. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and
the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251–59 (1980); ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 123–24 (1982).
311
. See generally Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); James Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law,
51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Aaron Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design
Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982).
312
. See generally Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 (1992); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); James G. Wilson, Surveying the
Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1995).
313
. See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t: When Do We Kiss It and
When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605 (1990); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991).
314
. See generally LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal
Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW 17–36 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1910) (1861).
315
. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687
(1990); Daniel J. Morrissey, S.E.C. Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427 (2001).
316
. See generally William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (1993). See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17 (1971)
(Burger, C.J.) (invoking the “judiciary’s historic equitable remedial powers” in the school desegregation context
to require busing). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930);
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979);
MALCOLM M. FEELY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (2000); GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982)
(criticizing the Supreme Court’s use of equity to implement a political vision that is inconsistent with positive
law). But see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999)
(limiting scope of substantive equity to rights existing in 1789).
317
Percy J. Bordwell, The Resurgence of Equity, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 741, 747 (1934) (“In an indiscriminate
“fusing” or an indiscriminate borrowing, these principles are likely to be lost. They are likely to be lost even in the
administration of equity itself by judges with only a legal point of view.”).
318
Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, __ TEX. L. REV. 244, 248 (__);
319
Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, __ TEX. L. REV. 244, 255 (__).
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IV. CONTEMPORARY DUAL SYSTEMS—THE DIALECTIC IN PRACTICE
ADR stepped into the breach by operating as a check upon the “strict
law” that is now codified in the procedures of the merged system. ADR
emerged to offer procedural flexibility and discretion.320 And by channeling
Equity’s emphasis on the moral and ethical significance of individualized
justice, it offered an alternative substantive vision.321 But as Professor
Resnik’s Schwarz lecture details in full,322 we should beware the
boomerang.323
ADR was meant to challenge the adversarial system, but has instead
been taken over by formal adjudication while, at the same time, itself
becoming more formalized and adversarial.324 First, the courts have been
ADRized.325 Proponents of ADR have succeeded in making it an integral
part of our judicial system.326
Via legislation, national and local rule making, and executive proclamation,
every branch of the federal government has signalled [CQ] its support of
ADR…. [A]pproval in theory of ADR has become commonplace.327

The irony of the institutionalization and co-optation by courts of a litigation
alternative has been fully discussed.328 Yet the path toward full integration
320

See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
322
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 253-54 (1995);
323
See n. __.
324
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 253-54 (1995); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary
Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR,” 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 5, 13-16 (1991); Lucy V.
Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the
Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 5.
325
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 300 (1996)
(discussing the “ADRization” of the courts). See J. Clark Kelso & Thomas J. Stipanowich, Protecting Consumers
in Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1998, at 11.
326
Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. __, 246-47 (1996); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 213 (1995); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR
and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 302 (1996).
327
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 239-40 (1995).
328
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication,
10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 262-63 (1995) (citing Craig A. McEwen, Lynn Mather & Richard J.
Maiman, Lawyers in and Everyday Life: Mediation in Divorce Practice, 28 J. L. & Soc., 149, 183 (1994)
(Mediation of divorce in Maine as is used in “heavily litigated” cases, relies on “legal rules,” serves as a
“relatively formal adjunct to negotiation,” and “strengthens … the ability of lawyers to influence decisions.”));
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The
Law of ADR,” 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 5, 13-16 (1991) (ADR was meant to “challenge” the adversarial system,
but instead ADR has been taken over and changed by the system. Capture, “colonization,” and co-optation have
transformed ADR into “just another stop in the ‘litigotiation’ game); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 5
(“voluntary nature of alternatives has been eroded,” and it is problematic for ADR to take on formalistic
characteristics of adjudication). See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea
321
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has been paved, and the road named.329 “CDR,” which stands for
complementary dispute resolution,330 quite literally takes the “alternative”
out of ADR.
Meanwhile, the flexibility and informality of ADR is under siege. As
ADR becomes increasingly popular,331 there appears the inexorable desire
to crystallize its processes.332 This “creeping legalism” makes ADR more
complex, costly, and time-consuming.333 It should hardly surprise, then, that
the contemporary empirical data fails to demonstrate conclusively that any
forms of ADR are, in fact, faster or cheaper than formal adjudication.334 Yet
the commentators offer still more ideas adding layers of reforms.335
for Statutory Reform, 5 J. Disp. Resol. 231, 233 (1990) (criticizing Supreme Court enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate as undermining the volition critical to arbitration’s integrity, and lauding arbitration for its capacity to
provide “adjudicatory, self-determination”); Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, Cal. Law., Feb. 1994, at
53-54 (growing concern about the bills of court-appointed, court-annexed ADR providers); Susan S. Silbey,
Mediation Mythology, 9 Negotiation J. 349, 353 (1993) (critiquing proposed “guidelines for selecting mediators”
as both wrongly portraying the role and also restricting access to the profession). Cf. Edward Brunet, Arbitration
and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. Rev.81 (1992) (calling for constitutional rights in private contractual
arbitration to ensure due process fairness).
329
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
Accomplis, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 308 (1996)
(advocating adoption of more ADR practices).
330
Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1291 & n.3 (1998).
331
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
332
SHELDON AMOS, THE SCIENCE OF LAW 57 (1875).
333
Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58- APR DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 38 & n.1
(Feb.-Apr. 2003).
334
See generally Deborah R. Hensler, What We Know and Don’t Know About Court-Administered
Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986) (finding no significant, demonstrable savings in court-annexed ADR);
Deborah R. Hensler, RAND’s Rebuttal: CJRA Study Results Reflect Court ADR Usage, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO THE
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 79 (1997) (finding court-annexed arbitration had little effect on time to disposition or
costs); James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of Mediation an dearly Neutral Evaluation Under the civil Justice
Reform Act 48-53 (RAND 1996) (arguing that arbitration, mediation, and early neutral evaluation produced no
“statistically significant” reductions in time to disposition, the costs of litigation, perceptions of fairness, or client
satisfaction); Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (1995) (“Efficiency gains from courtannexed arbitration and court-mandated family mediation in custody suits appear mixed: The fiscal savings to
courts from diverting cases from trial may be outweighed by the costs of running an efficient ADR program, and
savings in lawyer time are often modest and not necessarily passed on to litigants through lower legal fees.”);
Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness’s Agenda for
Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 248 (1992) (“Mandated settlement conferences have been in use in state trial
courts for at least four decades. Their effectiveness at saving costs has yet to be demonstrated empirically.”); Lisa
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration
Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2211 (1993) (“there is no conclusive evidence that [court-annexed ADR]
programs reduce either the private or social costs of disputing”); Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical
Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 834 (2000) (“cases referred by courts to
ADR activities … lasted longer, on average, than the mean for all cases”); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 889 (1991) (comparing districts with and without
court-annexed ADR and finding that “ADR districts are neither more efficient nor less efficient in handling
caseloads or inducing settlement than peer districts”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an
Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 9 n.33
(1991) (collecting sources).
Until [1973], when the [American Arbitration Association’s] 50-year-old logo was redesigned, its motto was
“Speed, Economy, and Justice.” That year [the Association’s president, Robert Coulson] dropped the motto.
“People used to promote arbitration with those adjectives like religious zealots,” he says. “I don’t think any of
these words are entirely accurate.”

James Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, AM. LAWYER 107, 107 (Jan./Feb. 1985). See
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For decades, practitioners have reported that arbitration is neither faster
nor cheaper than more formal adjudication.336 This is surely attributable, at
least in part, to the fact that many of the procedural bells and whistles of
formal adjudication have been incorporated into arbitration proceedings.337
Arbitrators are often statutorily vested with broad judicial powers to

also Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, , LITIG. Winter 1985, at 30 (“Today’s
research confirms what Hart and Sacks saw twenty-six years ago: arbitration may be quicker than litigation, but it
is not less expensive.”); Richard J. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAW, Feb. 1994, at 54-55 (using
anecdotal information to question whether arbitration is really cheaper than litigation); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 452-76 (1988) (observing that many survey respondents
disagreed that arbitration was faster and cheaper than litigation).
On the other hand, of course, there are many who trumpet the time and cost savings associated with ADR—
particularly outside the arena of court-annexed ADR.
The Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution claims that for a five-year period ending in
1995, 652 companies using CPR panelists reported a total cost savings of over $200 million, with an average
cost savings of over $300,000 per company. A 1993 article contended that since 1990, 406 companies saved
more than $150 million in legal fees and expert-witness costs by using litigation alternatives in cases with an
aggregate of over $5 billion in dispute. One insurance carrier allegedly saved between $150,000 to $200,000
per case by mediating disputes pursuant to a pact negotiated by the Institute for Dispute Resolution.

Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2105 (2002) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
335
Recent proposed protocols call for elements such as the right to a competent and impartial neutral,
represenation, prehearing access to reasonably relevant information, full availability of remedies, and reasoned,
written opinions. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 987-88 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 19, 60 (1999). For a sample of reform efforts regarding the Uniform Model Mediation Act, see, e.g.,
Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 787 (1998); Model
Mediation law Effort Begins, Disp. Resol. Mag., Fall 1997, at 20; expanded judicial review of arbitration awards,
see, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 49, 124-29 (1997) (contending that parties should be allowed to incorporate a desired level of
judicial review into their contract); Stephen A. Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error—An Option
to Consider, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 103, 11016 (1997) (arguing that parties ought to be able to contract
for whatever level of judicial review will serve the parties’ interests, but suggestinglimiting review to legal error
to avoid substantial increased costs); Leanne Montgomery, Casenote, Expanded Judicial Review of Commercial
Arbitration Awards—Bargaining for the Best of Both Worlds: Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130
F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 554 (2000) (reviewing the Lapine decision and concluding that
contracting for increased judicial review may encourage continued use of arbitration)); personal liability for
arbitrators, see Mark A. Sponseller, Note, Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed Qualified Immunity Statute
for Arbitrators, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 421,421 (1993); Note, Gaar v. Tigerman: An Attack on Absolute Immunity for
Arbitrators!, 21 CAL. L. REV. 564, 585 (1985); amending arbitration laws to protect the contracting process from
corruption, see Steven Goering, The Standard of Impartiality as Applied to Arbitrators by the Federal Courts and
Codes of Ethics, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 821, 832 (1990); oversight of arbitrators, Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 408, 419 (1997); ethics reforms, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and
Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 166-92 (1999); prohibiting ADR in
certain cases, Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. __, 298 (1996). See generally Cameron L. Sabin, Note, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel:
Private Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1362 (2002).
336
Creeping Legalism in Labor Arbitration, 13 ARBITRATION J. 129 (1958); James Lyons, Arbitration: The
Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 107, 110 (Jan./Feb. 1985) (“‘I tell my clients,’
one lawyer says, ‘that it should cost just as much for a complex construction arbitration as it costs for
litigation.’”); James Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 107,
110 (Jan./Feb. 1985) (“But, as one arbitration veteran warns, ‘Once you get Wall Street lawyers in there, you
might as well go to court.’ The Kaiser/Condec arbitration is an extravagant—but not unique—deomnstration of
the fact that the costs of arbitration rise dramatically if the parties hire big outside law firms, call large numbers of
witnesses, and present elaborate technical arguments.”).
337
See, e.g., American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
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administer depositions338 and discovery,339 including subpoena340 and
sanction powers.341 Arbitrators often write opinions,342 and their cases grow
increasingly complex through consolidation and intervention.343
The public, or at least lawyers, appear to want still more
formalization.344 The major ADR providers have voluntarily moved to
bolster the “due process guarantees” of their processes.345 And an
advertisement for National Arbitration Forum in a recent issue of the ABA
Journal reads:
All Arbitration is Not the Same. Unlike the others, only the Forum offers a
national panel of seasoned legal professionals and a procedural code requiring
arbitrators to follow the law in making decisions and awards. To learn more
about the National Arbitration Forum, log onto the world wide web at
www.arbitration-forum.com.346

Professor Sherman’s conclusion, in 1993, that ADR and formal adjudication
had “a great deal in common” grows ever truer.347
V. MAKING THE CASE FOR EQUITY IN ADR
Equity is a metaphor for the commitment that the law will be readily
adaptable for, and directed toward the achievement of justice. It is fortunate,
then, that Equity enjoys a certain inevitability throughout history.348 When
the rigidity of the Law courts failed to keep pace with the growing wants of
society, the discretionary and flexible system of Equity provided the
sensible remedies.349 Similarly, when the forms and modes of formal
338

See Unif. Arbitration Act § 7, 7 ULA 199; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1283, 1283.05.
See Unif. Arbitration Act § 7, 7 ULA 199; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1283.05, 1283.1.
340
See 9 U.S.C. § 7; Unif. Arbitration Act § 7, 7 ULA 199; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1282.6.
341
See 9 U.S.C. § 7; Unif. Arbitration Act § 7, 7 ULA 199; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1283.05. See also Lucy
V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the
Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 37-41.
342
James Lyons, Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 107, 109
(Jan./Feb. 1985) (discussing an arbitration where the panel’s opinions “delivered over the course of eight months,
totaled more than 600 pages in length and provided detailed explanations, often with citations, for each decision.”)
343
Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998).
344
Professor Reuben argues that the surprisingly small amount of “voluntary” participation in ADR
programs is attributable to the lack of formal due process protections. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:
A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 987-88
(2000). See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Institutionalizing ADR Programs in Courts, Appdx. C. “Why ‘Volunteer’
ADR Programs are Likely to Attract Few Cases, and thus, Why Volunteer Programs are Not Likely to Contribute
Significantly to Cost and Delay Reduction” in EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 52, 122
(ABA 1991).
345
Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: Form ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in
Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 935 (2002)
346
ABA JOURNAL __ (October 2004) (emphasis added).
347
Edward F. Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of Participation
Should be Required?, 46 SMU L. Rev. 2079, 2082-83 (1993).
348
Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 753
(1945) (““Equity is a thing of continuous growth, and not the sort of Phoenix that dies ever so often”).
349
Warren B. Kittle, Courts of Law and Equity—Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L. Q. 21,
27 (1919-1920) (“Many cases arose in which all men of sense admitted that there should be a remedy provided,
339

11-Mar-05

ADR: THE NEW EQUITY

57

adjudication became insufferable, ADR emerged to provide a sensible
method of dispute resolution that was discretionary and flexible.350 ADR
offered a check upon the “strict law” that was codified in the procedures of
formal adjudication and acted in opposition to it.351 It generated
experimental methods of dispute resolution with fresh perspectives on
procedural and social justice.352
Yet the law’s demand for certainty is Equity’s foil. An ironic
consequence of Equity’s success was the ensuing effort to crystallize the
jurisprudence of that court.353 The gradual introduction of procedural rules
and structural orthodoxy ultimately caused Equity to collapse under the
weight of its own precedents and processes.354 The legacy of Equity was
preserved in those doctrines that had been adopted by the Law courts,355 but
equity was less dynamic and generative in the merged system.356
ADR reanimated the spirit of equity. But because of its tremendous
popularity,357 ADR now faces a wave of reforms that would transform its
flexible and discretionary modes of resolution into a more systematic
framework.358 One might suggest, of course, that this transformation of
ADR is inevitable in light of the ongoing dialectic between law and equity.
Moreover, the inevitability of equity, too, will ultimately resurface
thereafter in some form or another (as ADR succeeded Equity). Those
suggestions, though accurate, do not justify inaction, however, because we
can control the pace and trajectory of that progression.
The history of Law and Equity offers a cautionary tale about the
benefits of systematization. To be sure, the lot of recent and proposed
reforms to ADR are derived of noble intents and purposes.359 However, we
should be skeptical of that which introduces detail and complexity. Lord
Hardwicke probably did not anticipate that by weaving “the strands of
judicial decision into the indestructible fabric of equitable jurisprudence” he
was crafting the cloth that would later asphyxiate his beloved Equity.360

but which the narrow-minded judges denied.”).
350
See nn. __ supra and accompanying text.
351
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
352
Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social
Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49 (2004).
353
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
354
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
355
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
356
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
357
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
358
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
359
See nn. __,supra and accompanying text.
360
Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke: Science of Trust Law, 11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319, 337, (19351936). Because the quoted material is taken out of context, I would emphasize here that Professor Brown’s
account of Lord Hardwicke’s indefatigable and worthy efforts on behalf of Equity is extremely favorable.
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The moral growth of the law is the record of the slow emergence of
equity into the mainstream of the law.361 Dialectic requires dialogue, and it
is through the interplay of law and equity that both are enriched.362
Law and equity should be in continual progress, with the former constantly
gaining ground upon the latter. Every new and extraordinary interposition is,
by length of time, converted into an old rule. A great part of what is now strict
law was formerly considered as equity, and the equitable decisions of this age
will unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of the next.363

The certain and uniform application by courts of fixed general laws serves
many functions beyond the resolution of disputes.364 The symmetry and
efficiency that strict law provides is essential not only to justice, but also to
equity. Maitland said that a system of Equity without Law would be
“anarchy” (the “castle in the air”); but less often quoted is his statement that
a system of Law without Equity would be “barbarous, unjust, [and]
absurd.”365 Justice thus requires certainty and predictability, on one hand,
and the ameliorating exercise of discretion, on the other.366 Neither Law nor
Equity can perform the other’s function; a merged system performs neither
function particularly well, and tends to rigidify.367
ADR thus plays an important role in the growth of the law. Without that
engine, “our law will be moribund, or worse.”368 Of course an Equity model
for ADR requires one to accept that these cases may be decided in fora that
do not offer all of the trappings of formal due process or the familiar
characteristics of dispute resolution.369 This prospect may be especially
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The tendency … has plainly and steadily been towards the giving an undue prominence and superiority to
purely legal rules, and the ignoring, forgetting, or suppression of equitable notions…. In short, the principles,
doctrines, and rules of equity are certainly disappearing from the municipal law of a large number of the
states, and this deterioriation will go on until it is checked either by a legislative enactment, or by a general
revival of the study of equity throughout the ranks of the legal profession.
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unsettling in light of the large numbers and broad types of disputes that
courts send or litigants take to ADR.370 But an Equity model suggests that
the response to this phenomenon lies not with reforms to the system of
ADR that is attracting (or receiving) these cases. Rather the answer suggests
reforms to the formal system that is scaring (or sending) them away. After
all, ADR must remain a “living, changing thing, forever adapting itself to
new conditions.”371
The Equity model would suggest that ADR should hear and decide only
those types of cases where the formal courts fail to provide an adequate
remedy.372 Equity respected the authority of the Law courts and did not
interfere in cases where the remedy was adequate.373 Of course if the formal
courts did not provide an adequate remedy and the case proceeded in ADR,
the Equity model would counsel against interference by the formal system.
Neutrals in the independent system of ADR would be free to adapt to the
challenges of the case before them without obligation or duty to external
statutes or rules. And it would be the repeated exercise of this kind of
jurisdiction that would identify systemic failures of the formal system and,
ultimately, have a reforming influence thereon.374
In this model, then, the courts and the legislature would be able to
“prevent” any case from going to ADR by simply providing an adequate
remedy. The adequate remedy might itself be an alternative method that had
been incorporated into the courts. Procedural reform would continue to
focus on a taxonomy or classification system for allocating particular types
of disputes between ADR and different dispute resolution forms.375 The
target of those reforms, however, would be the “formal” adjudication
process rather than the separate system of ADR.
An appreciation for the role of ADR in a dual system founded in
principles of Law and Equity would transform courts and de-regulate ADR.
Presumably courts and legislators would develop a set of jurisdictional
principles that would delimit those areas, if any, in which it need not
provide an adequate remedy. “To devise better court procedures, we must at
some point determine what special role courts—in contrast to other
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agencies—can most usefully play in delivering justice to the people.”376 The
reconceptualization exercise imagined here offers insight into that process.
CONCLUSION
A dialectic of law and equity can be traced from the dual traditional
systems of Law and Equity to the contemporary systems of formal
adjudication and ADR. The equitization of Law and the legalization of
Equity led ultimately to the merger of Law and Equity. In contemporary
adjudication we are experiencing, simultaneously, the ADRization of
litigation and the litigization of ADR. The merger of Law and Equity offers
a cautionary tale that discourages the trajectory of current ADR reforms.
Instead, ADR should be de-regulated and the formal courts encouraged to
develop more effective means and modes of dispute resolution.
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